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The Korean Student Movement: The Mobilization Process

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THE KOREAN STUDENT MOVEMENT:
THE MOBILIZATION PROCESS

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To those who are struggling
for the welfare of Korean community.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine the mobilization processes of the Korean student movement. In order to address the question of how the Korean students have been politically so active during the last three decades, my focus will be to elucidate the facilitating factors of the movement rather than to identify causal variables.

The analysis suggests that it is the organizational structures within the superimposed-segmented collectivity that have made it easy for the Korean students to engage in mobilizing and sustaining the movement. Particularly, cohesive, informal small group organizations on campuses have enhanced the chances of facilitating the mobilization processes.

Cultural and historical factors also help to understand the movement. A shared sense of beliefs, such as the consciousness of the Korean community and the legendary role of students in history, underlie the movement groups and make the movement symbolically meaningful to the participants.

Ideas are combined with moral and mythical qualities in the culture and become a facilitating factor of the movement. Ideas are important for the organized protest movement. They provide the direction, a clear target, and hopes, without which sustained violent confrontation would not be possible. Although ideas in themselves do not cause the violent movement, the way in which actors translate them into a plan of action becomes important in understanding confrontations. This is what Sorel calls a "myth." Therefore, we find the coexistence of both extreme characteristics in the ideological rhetoric of the radical Korean students: moral virtue and leftist absolutism.

THE KOREAN STUDENT MOVEMENT: THE MOBILIZATION PROCESS

I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis investigates the mobilization processes of the Korean student movement during the past thirty years. It is designed to describe and explain the Korean student activism and its accompanying forms of political violence.

College campuses in South Korea have been turbulent with frequent student unrest during these three decades. This continuing student movement has become one of the most structurally cohesive and tactically operative forces of political opposition in the country. The students of South Korea, unlike those in most other third world countries, have played a major role in political and social change. This has been a notable phenomenon in the political development of South Korea. For example, Korean students took an active part in overthrowing the Syngman Rhee government in April 1960 and intimidating the Park Chung Hee government. They were also leading actors in forcing the Chun Doo Hwan regime to make major changes in June 1987. Although the specific functional role they perform in the process of political institutionalization in Korea is hard to assess, the students are a politically active group particularly in the dynamics of political opposition. They continue pressing the present

Roh Tae Woo government toward greater "democratization" and toward regaining their "national identity" - i.e., the reunification of the country. At the same time, they strive to organize laborers, farmers, and poor urban groups.

It may puzzle many Westerners that so many competent Korean students have continuously risked promising careers by committing themselves to the student movement. That Korean students have become such a politically powerful group in their country may also be a peculiar phenomenon. How could Korean students become so active politically, and why do they oppose the governments so violently? What are the roles of political and interest groups in Korea? To answer these questions, it is essential to view the process of historical construction of the Korean student movement; that is, to examine historically how the student activism has been structured, and is presently structuring.

There are two extreme paradigmatic views in studying revolutions: the "pressure cooker theory" and the "conspiracy theory." The pressure cooker theory, which has a widely accepted set of explanations, refers to the image of a pressure cooker under which the heat has been turned up while the lid has been tightly clamped down. Unless the heat is turned down or a safety valve is opened to release some of the steam, sooner or later there is bound to be an explosion. In the simplest form of this theory, if the objective structural conditions oppress the people within a society, then a

revolutionary event spontaneously occurs. In other words, given such circumstances under which people are constantly pressured, a rebellion naturally follows by "the frustrated and angry masses" (Gurr, 1970). Skocpol (1979:17) expresses this view through Wendell Phillips' statement that "revolutions are not made; they come."

The opposing view implies the purposive image; it is called the conspiracy theory. From this outlook, revolution is the product of dangerous radicalism driven by a minority group. Proponents of conspiracy theory believe that there are outside agitators or others who are few in number, and the focus is exclusively on certain limited types of political activities. This theory assumes that a small number of people, who are enormously influential, sow the seeds of, and make, revolution to take over political power.

This portrayal of two extreme theoretical approaches is meant to highlight radical contrasts about the presuppositions of human social action. The pressure cooker theory presupposes action which is mechanically determined; people are simply driven to rise when certain conditions are present. On the other hand, the conspiracy theory presupposes voluntaristic action; people freely choose what they do. Thus, in their extreme forms, the former tends to focus exclusively on the social structural side; the latter solely on the social action side.

It is self-evident that both theories are one sided; they

reduce one to the other. But in reality, society is an historical construction and an interplay of two sides. By two sides, I mean the ways in which social action becomes social structure, action in turn is shaped by structure, and structure is, in time, transformed by action. Thus, we must recognize both sides simultaneously: the process is a dialectical relationship between action and structure. "Social action and social structure create and contain one another" (Abrams, 1982:108). So, it is fundamental for social scientists to recognize that voluntaristic action has to be preserved even while structural constraints are explained (Alexander, 1982).

Therefore, neither theory is an adequate tool to approach an understanding of revolution. Crane Brinton (1968:86) puts it as follows:

> Actually, we must reject both extremes, for they are nonsense, and hold that revolutions do grow from seeds sown by men who want change, and that these men do a lot of skillful gardening; but that the gardeners are not working against nature, but rather in soil and in a climate propitious to their work; and that the final fruits represent a collaboration between men and nature.

The major analytical problem of both theories, it seems to me, is derived from the fact that revolution is understood as a specific <u>thing</u>. It is, in my view, rather to be understood as historical events and processes. An event is not a structure or an object but a sequence of human actions compressed in time. A process is not a static state but

dynamic interplay of action and structure. Thus, revolution is to be understood essentially as a relationship, more specifically as an historical relationship. Human institution is not a fixed object. It is endlessly moving processes interweaving fact and meaning that construct, deconstruct, and reconstruct social experience. Regarding social action, the main agent of social change is the actor. One's action, then, -- whether one throws bombs or goes on a peace march, whether one protests about inequality or thrives on it -- depends largely upon "a matter of what previous experience has made possible and meaningful" (Abrams, 1982:3) for the actor.

Recently, there has been a significant amount of effort to examine revolutions in the historical context. For example, such works as those of Barrington Moore (1966), Eric Wolf (1971), and Theda Skocpol (1979) have contributed to this research in historical sociology. However, despite relative differences between these theorists, they have all focused primarily on structural conditions and the institutional consequences of revolutionary processes. For them, it appears that social action is elusive and remains a residual category. They treat the actual <u>relational</u> intentions of the parties as a factor of quite minor explanatory importance. For example, I doubt that one can explain thoroughly the French Revolution of 1789 without consideration of Louis XVI's actions with respect to the Third Estate, or the relationship between Louis XIV and his nobility a century earlier. As Abrams (1982: 190-

226) points out, what is needed is a "practical explanation" which gives more consolidation of "the general and particular" and also discreet consideration to colligating action and structure. This can be achieved, I believe, by leveling down their analytical focus to a middle ground.

The need for this "practical explanation" which can link the abstract and the specific makes it useful to begin at the ground level. The study of the process of a social movement is the first step in capturing the dynamic relationship of social action and social structure. To locate that general concern in concrete time and place, I chose the Korean student movement as the object of my analysis.

The examination of the Korean student movement could have led me to highlight a number of different issues. Questions of the dynamics of mobilization and its relation to political violence are of central importance. Equally fascinating is the issue concerning conflicts and resource mobilization among various groups arising within the context of political processes - particularly the role of the government and its related context within the international system. I consider the latter focus necessary and useful for a comparative historical generalization. For example, Brinton (1965), Skocpol (1979), Tilly (1978), even Marx and Engels (1982:287-323) have recognized and stressed the fact that a weak, confused, incompetent government invites or facilitates radical opposition to it. The ineptness of a government

should be understood in terms of not only the inability to mobilize historical resources but also what people perceive to be inefficiency or illegitimacy. However, it is desirable to sharpen the focus of the research to avoid a superficial, often times disqualifying presentation. One way of doing this is to concentrate solely on the facilitating factors of mobilization of the Korean students and its accompanying forms of violence in their activism. I have particularly concentrated on the organizational structure and the role of ideology in the Korean student movement.

In undertaking this study, I am not espoused to a single school of sociological thought. Instead of bringing along a hypothetical point of view for testing, I am interested in some specific sociological questions concerning collective action and various forms of political violence. For instance: How does collective action develop? Is violence a necessary ingredient in political conflict?

Much of the theoretical context of my investigation is taken from the "resource mobilization" models depicted by Oberschall(1973), Zald & McCarthy(1979), and Tilly(1979). At the same time, I have drawn on Georges Sorel's assertion about myth and violence. The work of many others, such as Dahrendorf's conflict theory, Braungart's theory of generational politics, and Berger and Luckmann's theory on ideology also have provided useful insights.

However, some limitations of the resource mobilization

model need to be recognized: that is, it is less concerned with the revolutionary (or movement) potential. Thus, it seems that the matter of how people's shared grievances, interests, or aspirations develop and change is not adequately explained. Its concern for the straight-forward assumption of individual action seems simply instrumental in relation to the collectivity. What Olson (1965) calls in his economic model a rational action is purely motivated by "selective incentives." According to this model, the balance of risk-reward is the only motivational aspect in the mobilization of collective action. In the situation of the Korean student movement, most ordinary students do not seem to be motivated solely by such incentives. It seems to me that the model minimizes the significance of the other aspect of human action, that is, nonrationality (of course, as opposed to irrationality). By nonrationality, I mean the subjective aspect of action which does not necessarily presuppose selective rewards, such as concern for freedom, equality, personal loyalty to the collectivity, sense of common identity, ideological awareness, etc.

Fireman and Gamson (1979) seem to capture this aspect with their attention to "solidarity," and they saw this as created and maintained as an organizational tactic in an attempt to preserve a collective good. However, having analyzed the data, I have come to the conclusion that solidarity is more than an organizational tactic by the

movement leaders. The elements have already prevailed in the culture. To put it differently, the leaders of a movement develop and extensively utilize those already existing elements within a culture in order to facilitate the movement process. For this reason, it is appropriate to examine this aspect in a broader cultural and ideological context.

Thus, the core of my discussion will revolve around some aspects of the student movement organization and its ideology within the context of the political culture of South Korea. To make it clear, my major concern is to identify facilitating factors that help to mobilize the groups of students. In sum, the purpose of this study is not intended to answer the question of "why" Korean students revolt. Instead, I focus on the "how" of the movement.

The following chapter foreshadows the outline of the theoretical argument itself. Explanations that the development of the Korean student movement derives from any single variable such as anger, frustration, unemployment, etc., are singly inadequate. It is the superimposed and vertically segmented structure of the student body, as well as a dense network of organization within it, that have easily facilitated the movement. Cultural factors such as shared identity and consciousness of community which enhance solidarity are equally important in facilitating the student movement, and serve to sustain the movement. Such cultural elements are likely to be perceived by members as being

challenged in a changing society.

Before moving into the analytical dimension of my thesis, I have highlighted in Chapter Three the history of the Korean student movement for readers who are not familiar with the Korean student movement. Readers who are familiar with it may skip this section.

In the first section of Chapter Four, I have introduced the importance of segmented informal group organization which applies to much of Korean life. An overview of confrontation of the military and the student is also proposed. Particular attention has to be paid to the student cohort group formation in the following section. The rest of the Chapter presents a detailed examination of the internal mobilization process of the Korean student movement. The movement has found it easier to mobilize the student body because of the preexisting networks of intermediate, internal organizational structures. The informal small groups, which are a dynamic part of cultural life in Korean society, have also helped greatly in facilitating the student movement. Particularly, when confronting the government control over the campus organizations, the Korean students develop clandestine small group "study-circle" cells to sustain their movement. It is with this primary group network in which each member is linked by means of strong, interpersonal bonds that Korean students are allowed to explore social issues and radical ideologies. As Henderson (1988:14) describes it, within this unit of cell

network all "plots against the authorities [are] cooked and hatched." The central aim of the discussion in this Chapter is to present the importance of intermediate organizational structure in mobilizing the protest movement. This discussion also revolves around other factors concerning the cultural patterns and historical role of the students.

Chapter Five deals with ideological aspects of the movement. My argument is that: First, ideas are an important facilitating factor which give "focus and direction to any frustrations or concerns a collectivity may have, thereby bringing some unity of perception" (Rhyne, 1988:10). Second, they dichotomize the world into "us" and "them," so that the movement group is able to see clearly who stands athwart its path. Third, by being a believable call to action, what Sorel calls a "myth," it can provide hopes that through concerted action something real can be achieved. This discussion illuminates the idea that the Korean student movement is born out of hopes as well as frustration or anger. The essential point in this chapter is that the presence of ideas makes the Korean students able to create a more or less organized protest group, without which sustained violent confrontation would not have been possible. In the concluding chapter, a summarization of findings is presented with a brief comparison to the Indonesian and Chinese student movements.

II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Quee-young Kim in his book, **The Fall of Syngman Rhee** (1983) argues that it was discontent that drove the people to rise against the Syngman Rhee government in April 1960. Many segments of the Korean people in general during that period supported the cause of the student movement against the government because they were frustrated and angered by the corrupt and unjust Syngman Rhee government. According to Kim, the April revolutionary movement was "a natural and inevitable event" growing out of the objective structural conditions of an inherently conflict-ridden Korean society. As he puts it:

> The Sa-il-gu [the April uprising] was indeed a socially creative act, neither accident nor miracle but a logical conclusion of conflict between social forces and political power. It evolved from certain structural conditions in which fundamental sets of social arrangement and power relations came into sharp contradiction and conflict with each other. (p. 209)

As evidence for his argument, Kim suggests that the mobilization was for the most part spontaneous, when unemployed and free-floating people in cities, brought there by rapid urbanization, gave support to the opposition and participated in the protest demonstration, by which they ultimately transformed the movement into a violent revolt.

According to Kim, the government created discontent among many people because it "failed to deliver economic development and employment" (p. 212).

> Rapid urbanization congregated large numbers of aimless people in the cities. ... For those who had nothing, and even less to look forward to, a moral protest against the government seemed to represent their feelings. ... The concentration of the educated, the students, and the unemployed in the cities helped to transform the protest demonstration into a violent revolt. (Kim, 1983:211)

It seems that Q. Y. Kim's explanation is similar to mass society theory (Kornhauser, 1959), which posits that rapid economic change causes "social dislocation" that creates alienation and discontent in a large portion of the population and ultimately a predisposition to revolt. From this point of view, as Kornhauser (1959:39) characterizes it, mass society is seen as "a social system in which elites are readily accessible to influence by non-elites, and non-elites are readily available for mobilization by elites." In this mass society context, the intermediate structures become thin; on the other hand, the centralized bureaucratic organizations grow, so that "members of the society lack attachments to independent groups, the local community, voluntary associations, and occupational groups" (Kornhauser, 1959:90), which means they are alienated. As a result, it establishes the grounds of greater potential for political radicalism. By "a natural and inevitable event," Q. Y. Kim evidently means that from the point of view of mass society theory it was a

few oppositional elites who directly mobilized the discontented and already available masses against the incumbent government. According to him:

> Opposition leaders championed the challenge against the ruling elites, the intellectuals fermented it, the students acted out, and the masses followed. (Q.Y. Kim, 1983:213)

Assuming Kim is correct in his contention that certain structural conditions drive people to rise, I then select, at least, an analytical problem when attempting to apply his theory to other times in Korea, not to apply it to other places. For example, if discontent is seen to be a sufficient factor in leading South Korea in 1960 into revolution, then should not that same rate of discontent, or a more magnified rate, lead her into revolution in other times? The problem can be seen in temporal terms. If it is argued that the rate of discontent is spread over a time, the question arises of how much of that factor must be present for the expected result to occur. Besides the temporal problem, the question must be asked of why particularly today and why not yesterday? If discontent is the causal factor, its objective rate might be greater in a feudal society than in an industrial one. This is the sociological problem that is left unexplained by Quee Young Kim's theory on the April uprising.

More importantly, what mass society theory and Q.Y. Kim's explanation inadequately overlooked was the mobilizing potential and mobilizing effects of intermediate structures

(Oberschall, 1973:104-13). Q.Y. Kim did not deny the major role performed by the students in mobilizing the April uprising. So then, we have to ask: Why students? According to Oberschall (1973), given the political conditions, the pre-existent networks of intermediate groups enhance the greater chances of mobilization of protest groups especially when those groups are superimposed and vertically segmented. It seems that Kim ignores the importance of the superimposed segmented structure of the student body, both compatible with a dense network of intermediate relations and high rates of students participation in them. It was not aimlessly free-floating nonparticipants in intermediate groups who made the uprising possible but the students who already had organizational structures and high rates of participation in them.

All too often in their attempts to find causal factors for revolutions, all too often, sociologists tend to focus on a specific kind of variable that is considered necessary for people or a group of people to react through violent confrontation. It seems that many theories, in order to explain revolutionary activity, have placed emphasis on some conditions which literally drive or push some identifiable, usually predictable group to act violently. No such variables, however, whether social, economic, political, psychological, structural, or processual, can sufficiently explain the phenomena in and of themselves. As I pointed

out earlier, it seems Kim's study on the April revolutionary movement ignores factors that facilitate the process of the movement. My question is why and how the Korean students have effectively mobilized to protest and have played a major role in the revolutionary movement? To answer it, in part, we should not neglect the fact that the student group is among the few segmented collectivities (Oberschall, 1973) who already have a dense and viable organization (Zald and McCarthy, 1977) that can be easily mobilized to protest. It is thus necessary to identify and elucidate those factors that help to mobilize a group of people within the movement organization. In other words, we need, as the first step, to focus on the factors which can facilitate the student movement or similar protests rather than cause them.

There is an ample body of research about revolutions and various forms of political violence dealing with each on its own terms. Given the diversity of general theories (Zimmermann, 1983), it appears that the basic approach to an intellectual problem is necessary for theoretical clarification. Rhyne (1988) attempts to collapse all this diversity into roughly two categories of theories which capture the basic approach to this intellectual problem, and presents them under two headings - "push" theories and "pull" theories. According to Rhyne (1988:2):

> By "push" theory, we mean the basing of an explanation on one or more conditions or factors which are seen as forcing, driving, or pushing some people or some social category toward revolution.

> ...By "pull" theory, we mean an explanation or model that emphasizes conditions or factors which facilitate the process of revolution.

The dichotomy of "push" - "pull," as Rhyne pointed out, may oversimplify many approaches to an intellectual problem. This oversimplification may twist the nature of many existing theories since very few are seen "purely as one type of theory with no trace of the other" (Rhyne, 1988:2). However, it is essential to make a distinction in an effort to seek more comprehensive analysis of social and political movement.

Although the push factor may be relatively meritorious in explaining certain revolutionary potentials, the primary analytical problem of "push" theories is that they are oblivious to cases which do not produce the expected results. It is important to note that "extremely revolutionary situations do not produce extremely revolutionary outcome" (Tilly, 1978:198) Then one must ask: How and why have South Korean students played such a critical role in the political opposition of the country while others have not? Why not other organizations, such as trade unions, parties, peasant groups, etc.? Are Korean students supposed to have more grievances or be more discontented than other groups of people? What do Korean students want to achieve? These questions are why it is crucial to shift our attention to elucidating the facilitating factors rather than identifying causing variables. Rhyne thus contrasts these two approaches:

> Just as the typical push theory takes for granted that a revolutionary process will necessarily follow

> from the existence of the "cause" and, therefore, the process is itself not theoretically problematic, the typical pull theory takes for granted the structural or other conditions which fuel revolutionary frustration. What it sees as analytically problematic are not the angers and frustrations but those things which make it easier or even possible for any particular group of people to mount a revolutionary challenge to the existing regime. At the risk of oversimplification, pull theory focuses on the how of revolution and push theory on the why. (1988:2)

Karl Marx is one major intellectual who developed a push theory. Marx saw revolution arising from the inevitable class conflict in any society with private property. The class conflict fundamentally grows out of the condition of economic exploitation. It is thus predictable ultimately to bring a revolutionary confrontation of the classes because the exploited and oppressed under capitalism are "pushed" into violent struggle with their oppressors (Karl Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party).

By contrast the currently most popular example of a pull theory of revolution, the resources-mobilization theory, seems not entirely content with exclusively facilitating factors. Of course, this pull theory has its own problems, such as the weak "explanatory power" and the unclear "critical variable" (Goldstone, 1980:430-34). However, it gives its emphasis to the segmentation or integration of a group and its concern with the organizational density of movement groups in which movements are engaged in the struggle for power within the broader political process (Oberschall, 1973; Gamson, 1975;

McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tilly 1979). Oberschall (1973) points out, stressing the lack of vertical integration into the larger society that any collectivity segmented from the larger society, has the potential to become a protest group. It makes it easier for potential protest-group members to express hostility to the rest of the society and thereby increases the ability of that collectivity to organize protest. Group superimposition has the same effect on the organizing potential of a collectivity. As Dahrendorf (1959:213-23) discussed, group superimposition lessens cross-cutting memberships and thereby weakens ties of interest or loyalty to a more varied pool of people. Therefore, the members of a superimposed group are easier to mobilize; or, in Dahrendorf's terms, the superimposed group or groups can move more easily from "latent" to "interest" group.

At comparable levels of segmentation and superimposition, McCarthy and Zald (1977) emphasize the organizational coordination of resources which refers to a collectivity that already has a dense, viable organizational structure that can transform itself more quickly into a protest group. Tilly (1978) also stresses, by suggesting the mobilization model, the degrees of organization within a collectivity as an important factor in mobilizing collective action. According to Tilly(1978:62-84), solidary organization consists of "catness" and "netness," called "catnet" for short, which refers to both a shared identity in a group and the density

of networks that link each member by means of interpersonal bonds.[1]

Given the facts above it seems to me that "pull" theories are more efficient in explaining the historical process of the Korean student movement. Nonetheless, I use the work of "push" theorists when pertinent. Although my general theoretical conceptions have been shaped largely by pull theories, it should not be concluded that all push theories are wrong. Both dimensions of "push" and "pull" are aspects of the same reality; society always has two faces. It is "Janus-faced." It is my intention with this pull approach to capture the multi-dimensional aspect of the Korean student movement. My basic assumption here implies that the pull approach would be more reflective and meritorious in revealing the actual process of the movement. This is the essential

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[1] One area of debate within the resource mobilization model has to do with how external resources should be focused on. External resources can refer to outside factors such as the favorable attention of media, socio-economic backgrounds of the participants, degree of support from the intellectual circles, and merger of other organizations and parties, etc. Both internal and external resources tend to closely relate to each other in the mobilization process. This study is focused primarily on the internal mobilization of resources, but the external factor, particularly the socio-economic background of activists have become moot points in debate. Some argue that the student activists in Korea come mostly from disadvantaged families (Henderson, 1988:18). On the contrary, in fact, some student activists come from the very affluent families. According to survey research (H.S. Lee, 1987:190-196), a large number of activists come from middle class family backgrounds. These external resources are also assumed to influence the mobilization process of the Korean student movement.

step for a scientific study and eventually inclusive of push factors. To put it differently, elucidating the process of the Korean student movement is more appropriate than simply identifying causal variables of it.

In this respect, it should be noted that Marx (1948) also paid some attention to pull factors such as enough urban concentration and sufficient unionization experience that would provide the basis for organized class action. As a recent example, Skocpol(1979) points out the importance of this idea. In analysis of agrarian structure and peasant insurrections, she shows that collectivities which already have a dense, viable organizational structure transforms easily and quickly into a protest groups, much more than do those with little or no internal organizational structure. According to Skocpol, the peasantry of France and Russia played crucial roles in their respective early involvement in the revolutions of 1789 and 1917 due to the pre-existence of independent village organizations. By contrast, the Chinese peasants got involved later in their revolution due to their relatively weak village community organizations. As Skocpol (1979: 114) puts it:

> In France and Russia, peasants mobilized for action through traditional village community organizations. In China, peasants first participated as traditional "social bandits" and then finally were directly (re)organized by the Chinese Communist Party.

Recognizing this importance of organizational structures, what I wish to accomplish is to focus on some dimensions which

can facilitate the Korean student movement. The goal of the present investigation is the same as that described by Rhyne (1988). Rhyne specifies three principal theoretical sources for identifying and elucidating pull factors, the first two of which will be used in this study. Those are: 1) resource mobilization theory which elucidates "the interrelated idea of the segmentation-integrating dimension of groups and density and nature of pre-existing organizational structures"; 2) Georges Sorel's idea that "revolutionary action is facilitated by the presence of what he calls a myth"; and 3) Crane Brinton's theme "that weak governments in trouble are the likely targets of revolution" (Rhyne, 1988:7).

SOCIAL CHANGE AS A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF DISCONTENT

Concerning the structural conditions or factors that might push people, such as economic condition, political oppression, discontent, frustration, angers, etc., one might vehemently argue that "a rebellion [revolution] cannot start from a situation of complete impotence" (Wolf, 1969:290). True enough, revolutionary organizations and ideologies are not produced from thin air. However, it is fundamental to note that, in a society as rapidly changing as Korea, and as subject to economic transformations (i.e., from agricultural to industrial), there is necessarily an enormous number of

discontented people in all classes - this societal change ultimately "implies a society with some movement, instability, even volatility about it" (Rhyne, 1988:11).

When a society goes through a significant change such as urbanization and industrialization, it is very likely to experience a loosely co-ordinated social structure, which may erode the old structure, bringing a new one, for instance, a sudden increase in number of laborers or the urban poor. This societal transformation inevitably provides a susceptibility to emerging new forms of social groups, such as trade unions and a variety of other organizations that are able to mobilize various kinds of political pressure and influence. A confrontation among interest groups (for instance, the old elites vs. the new middle class or a set of groups) is likely to emerge, too. While each group may attempt to mobilize their resources to protect or enhance their interests, the state machines may become weaker in the process.[2] Some may wish to topple the government, particularly when the government inefficiently and unfairly resolves the increasing conflicts. For example, with a sudden structural shift in

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[2] It is important to note that, unlike the traditional Marxist conception, the state is relatively autonomous from the control of the dominant class of a society. Skocpol (1979:24-33) portrays the state as an autonomous actor that has its own functions to perform. Thus, using state power to protect dominant class interests is not always inevitable. As she (1979:27) puts it: "states are potentially autonomous not only over against dominant classes but also vis-a-vis entire class structures or modes of production."

Korea in 1945, after the independence from Japan, various newly emerging political groups (approximately 50 different factions) were competing to dominate political power.[3] In the new Korean environment, society experienced a fierce struggle among these groups, and it grew worse with the rapid urbanization of the country. It is thus plausible to infer that after the collision is over the rest of the groups who were defeated in the struggle may feel discontented or possibly resentment toward the winner, especially when the game is perceived to be unfair. The rate of those feelings might be magnified if the winning group keeps suppressing them.

Actually, some historians tend to view the present political problem as primarily a result of the unfair resolution of the conflict among those groups by outside intervention in the first place. I am not arguing here that the 1960 uprising was the product of kinds of psychological deprivation or accumulated conflicts in large portions of the population.[4] I simply point out that it may be possible to

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[3] Actually, it is most correct to say that there were three major powerful political groups which had collided to compete for power. These were landlords, nationalists, and communists. Syngman Rhee allied with the first group and succeeded in taking over political domination in 1948.

[4] However, Cumings argues in his book, **The Origin of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes** (1979), that the Korean War (1950) was the product of this kind of struggle. More accurately, the conflicts were already built up during the colonial era. So the struggle was necessary to achieve a political reunification and reintegrate the divided nation. But the United States Military Government

infer this precipitating condition in the context of rapid urbanization and a sudden structural shift. In any case, we must be careful when to argue on "an aggregate-psychological state" of population unless we find direct historical data "interviewed individually at the outbreak of, and recurrently during," (Skocpol, 1979:115) the uprising. Nevertheless, it may be safe to say that the structural condition of the changing society provides the most likelihood of conflicts among different groups.

South Korea for the last several decades has experienced an enormous change in almost every aspect of life, both in materials and values, most strikingly in the economy. For example, the GNP per capita, which was less than $100 in 1960, has increased to $2,870 in 1987. The rapid economic growth brought increased numbers into the working and middle classes, but the new classes were unable to have their own autonomous organizations.

According to Chirot (1986: 96-130), in the twentieth century, unlike the time of early Western industrialization, an underdeveloped nation must have a strong state machine if

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from 1945 to 1948 played the major role in tipping the balance against the Marxist left. He continues to argue that the battle was an effort for national unity, not another case of Soviet's national expansionism. It seems to me that he is primarily concerned with being morally putative towards the U.S. interventionism into the Korean affairs, which condition is believed to cause revolution. Therefore, presupposing the revolutionary condition, Cumings tends to mythify the mass as a left counterforce against the right wing class and its supporter, the U.S. interventionist.

it wants to have any chance for catching up with the advanced industrial nations. Chirot argues that the effort of industrialization commanded by a centralized bureaucracy inevitably brings the outcome of political repression (for example, the Soviet Union under Stalin). Therefore, the state's new despotic rule confronts "not only internal dangers but grave external dangers as well" (Chirot, 1986:124). In this regard, the Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan governments - with a strong centralized power during the last couple of decades - have successfully attained the economic growth. On the other hand, however, their economic achievements are exactly comparable to the result of serious political suppression. The government has implemented a policy of keeping the wages down and labor organizations weak, and in some cases allowed an exploitation of workers by unscrupulous employers. While the independent labor unions and political opposition groups were repressed, harassed and outlawed by the governments, only the student group could have maintained their relatively autonomous organizational structures. This autonomous structural factor, in my opinion, made the students gain relatively important and rigorous status in political opposition in South Korea.

The industrialization of Korea has been achieved at the expense of political repression of civil rights, and has brought the perception of an ever widening gap between the poor and the rich. This has, in itself, provided more serious

issues for the student movement beginning in the 1970s.[5] What the students have been most concerned about is, among other issues, the unequal distribution of wealth. As they put it:

> The challenge and task the people of this land in our time must embrace is the overcoming of the economical inequalities, political oppression, and cultural alienation, and the realization of reunification of the nation/people and democracy, by people who, as the subjects of history, work to achieve liberation.[6]

One may have to ask how bad the situation of income equality is presently in South Korea. According to a study on the growth of the Korean economy done by the Harvard Council on East Asian Studies (Mason, Kim, et al., 1980:444), income distribution among Koreans is fairly stable except in areas of business, high level managers, and professionals. Their conclusion is that overall the level of income inequality is relatively modest and equality of opportunity is high compared to other developing countries. In other words, the performance of distribution of wealth in general is relatively good when compared to other countries, even to the industrialized nations (The World Bank, 1988:273). Then,

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[5] In 1970, failing to organize a trade union, an industrial worker, Chun Tae-il committed suicide by fire crying "Observe the Labor Standard Law"; "We are not machines"; "Let us rest on Sundays"; and "Do not sweat the laborers." Since then, some student movement leaders began to pay attention to the deplorable working conditions and relatively low wages of the laborers resulting from the industrialization of the country.

[6] Source comes from an anonymous leaflet in reaction to the public prosecutor's report on the investigation of the **Sammintu** student organization in 1985.

one might wonder why the Korean students negatively view the fact and latch onto the relativity issue by using such an absolute term as inequality. To this question, it is important to note that most Korean people (probably all Koreans) had long been equally poor in history. They have tended to share wealth collectively beyond class boundaries. The perceived gap of wealth and the better opportunity to upward social mobility for common people that a sudden industrialization brought have generated relative perception of poverty on an unprecedented scale. For example, the stark contrast of rapidly increased numbers of the urban poor and ever expanding high-income industrial sectors are truly apparent. This may have disrupted the historically enduring sense of economic egalitarianism.

Culturally, Korean's attitude towards poverty was not negative at all; in reverse, the selfish accumulation of wealth was viewed very negatively. Thus, the pauper was somewhat regarded as virtuous. For example, many scholars and some national leaders historically used to put themselves voluntarily in the state of the pauper as a self-discipline, and symbolically identify it as a moral uprighteousness. This means, in other words, that the ideal of the poor gentry is the respectable man of integrity. This value of economic prosperity as less important than morality functioned to lessen the psychological gap of social inequality and ritualistically enhance the sense of collective homogeneity.

Because of this historical precedent, the inequality issue in the student movement has more to do with cultural factors than objective structural conditions. It is also necessary to give attention to a more or less strong egalitarian subculture on campus. Therefore, it is inadequate to understand the student movement in terms solely of a structural condition or of an organizational tactic of the movement group.

But, more importantly, this societal transformation has created "a structurally-induced collective biographical ambivalence" (Stanfield, 1988:class) which refers to a situation in which their old cultural ways are breaking down yet the new ways of culture are still indistinct and ambiguous. This implies some degree of uncertainty or unpredictability, as the speed of change is too fast to grasp the new meaning of their changing cultural ways. In this ambivalent situation people are unsure as to where to be and how to act and more likely to define who they are in an effort to make value consensus - they may feel that their normal, routine, stable, old life is disrupted by newness or foreignness. The effort in search for new order may imply that it is itself a social movement or an incipient pre-condition of one.

It is apparently true in Korea that there is a serious generational conflict (Hyo Sun Lee, 1987). Braungart (1984) contends that this generational gap may arise from ambivalent beliefs stemming from different historical experiences. The

new values created by the active student body are not compatible with the ones of the old generation. Their new paradigm of world views of radical students create a sharp conflict with the conventional one. The recent endeavor for a new identity, which was materialized into "anti-Americanism" emerged also as a unifying issue in the Korean student movement, and is a good example of this changing paradigmatic world view of the new generation.

> The United States should not make Korea its subordinate country, but leave this land. ...The United States has supported the military regime which refuses democratization, social revolution and development and unification. In fact, the United States has brought about the permanent national division. We must resolve this problem for ourselves. Let us stage the anti-U.S. struggle to eliminate U.S. culture. (Recitation from Wonmo Dong, 1986:238. A leaflet distributed by a group of seminary students when they set the United States Information Service building in Pusan afire on March 1982.)

Compared to the perception of the preceding generation toward the United States - such as a liberator, a peace keeper, a bloody ally, a democratic sponsor, etc. - the new generation's perception is radically different. The new perception of the world of many students in the movement circle - whether it is wrong or right - is seriously challenging the traditional world views. However, the new outlook seems to have gained more sympathizers from the student population. In an endeavour to promote solidarity of the student body, various and diverse cultural programs were planned and undertaken by on-campus movement organizations in

the 1980s. The vigorous cultural activity on campus in turn reinforces the grounds for a unified and active student community and attracts the general student body into a movement circle.

III. A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The origin of the Korean student movement dates back to Confucian times (Yi dynasty: from 1392 to 1910). During this period, students in the National Confucian Academy, which trained talented members of the gentry (yangban), commonly joined scholars in protesting to insist on a just government. The Confucian ideal of moral purity strongly abides with remonstrance obligations and reforming zeal. Thus, in 1450, student demonstrations protested against the Great King Sejong's alleged "soft-on-Buddhism" policies. In 1875, students joined scholars in their protest and remonstration against the dominant Prince Regent which led to his downfall (Henderson, 1988:7).

Under the Japanese colonialism, from 1910 to 1945, students were the chief activists for the Korean Independence Movement. For example, from the beginning of the Independence Movement in 1919 and onward, students not only played the activist role to mount nationwide demonstrations but also suffered the brunt of ruthless Japanese retaliation. (In average, 55 strikes of students occurred annually)

The liberation from Japan in 1945 brought active student

demonstrations against Korean collaborators with the Japanese, and against many policies of the American and Soviet occupation. This specific period (1945-47) can be said to be an era of right-vs-left confrontation among intellectuals, students, and nationalists that was soon quelled by the emergence of the dominant post-war political paradigm, anti-communism in South Korea.

During the 1950s, Korean students were largely mobilized for anti-communist rallies by the Syngman Rhee government. The students were organized and often mobilized by Rhee regime under the name of Anti-Communist Youth League in an attempt to counter-balance the challenges from the oppositional political parties in post-Armistice Korea.

The period of the student movement discussed above is not the direct concern of this research. However I present this to assist the reader in better understanding the historical role of the students in Korea (for detail, see Appendix I, Chronology of Student Movement in South Korea).

The 1960s brought great unrest and direct challenge to the ruling regime. The most famous student demonstrations occurred in April 1960 in Masan and Seoul in reaction to the ruling party's rigging of the election of March 15 and the use of police violence to repress student protest. The discovery of the dead body of a young student in Masan harbour - apparently killed by police torture - inspired students in

Seoul to protest the fraudulent presidential election. This student uprising in Seoul unexpectedly succeeded in toppling the confused and incompetent Syngman Rhee regime - Rhee resigned on April 29 - and eventually brought in the parliamentary democratic regime of Dr. Chang Myon. However, the continuing student demonstrations advocating punishment of Rhee profiteers and demanding national unification under the Chang Myon government invited Park Chung Hee's military coup in May 1961.

The reemergence of student uprising against the establishment of relations with Japan in 1964-65 almost succeeded in ending the military regime of Park much in part because of the large number of participants; but Park immediately took a drastic measure against student demonstrations by stationing army troops on campuses and closing high schools and colleges. The student movement was confronted with an effective armed force of Park and was forced to go underground. Since the extreme "Yushin" [7] measures, in 1972, banning virtually all opposition including student organizations and demonstrations, stringent campus controls and arrest and torture of student leaders by the Korean CIA, police, and even the military intelligence agency,

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[7] It is a major constitutional reform by Park Chung Hee regime; direct presidential vote has been replaced by indirect elections and made Park in effect "president-for-life." More detailed discussion will be presented in the following section.

reinforced a cycle of violent hostility between Park Chung Hee and the students that lasted until his assassination in October 1979 at the hands of the director of the KCIA, Kim Jae Gyu.

During the post-Park era, demonstrations for constitutional revision, direct democratic elections, removal of martial law and the remnants of the Yushin system, intensified as students poured off the campuses into the streets of Seoul and many other cities. On May 17, 1980, Martial Law was extended throughout the country. This measure closed universities, prohibited demonstrations, reimposed prior censorship, and outlawed criticism and "rumors." All chief opposition leaders, including student leaders, were arrested as a result.

Students in Kwangju responded to the news of martial law by protesting in the streets. In response to this, "Chun Doo Hwan, head of the Defense Security Command, acting director of the KCIA, and new authoritarian leader," (Henderson, 1988:9) sent Special Forces (paratroopers) who put them down with brutality. The brutality brought about a general reaction of protest from the public, and the protesters succeeded in driving the paratroopers from the city. The demonstrators occupied the city of Kwangju for several days as a free zone until the 20th Division of the ROK-US Combined Forces, which was under the Command of the United Nations Forces, was sent to restore control of

Kwangju.[8] The 20 Division was removed by the Chun regime presumably without permission from the Commander (the United States Army General). This incident brought about a controversial argument among many intellectuals and students about the U.S. role in Kwangju. Student movement leaders, believing that the U.S. supported the Chun regime, have latched onto this incident and vigorously pursued it as a means of stirring anti-American sentiments.

The Chun regime maintained even harsher measures against the student movement. According to Cumings(1986:159), "Some 15,000 protesters were arrested and placed in the reeducation camp" (so-called "Samchung Kyoyuk Dae") after the Kwangju insurrection. Under his brutal repression, student activists went completely underground to avoid governmental and professorial control and eventually formed well-organized secret networks, which has been effectively operated for recruiting and inculcating new members as well as for mobilizing demonstrations. In addition, their opposition goals marked a shift from democratic ideals to a revolutionary leftist stance. Unlike the previous movement, in the 1980s leadership of the student movement has become organizationally clandestine, tactically subversive, and small group oriented, similar to a revolutionary vanguard party.

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[8] Religious and citizens groups concluded that as many as 2,000 persons had been killed during the ten day uprising. However, the government figure indicates less than 200. This is now under investigation by the National Assembly.

In 1987, the federation of these underground small groups with inter-campus cooperatives successfully led the major demonstrations, under less radical agitation, by gaining great support from middle class citizens. These in turn led to the major constitutional changes of the ruling party's platform in June 29, 1987, of which the direct presidential election was a central issue. In the December election of 1987, Roh was elected with a 36 percent popular vote against a divided opposition.

Presently, student demonstrations against the Roh government continue with a new political issue, under which various movement organizations are united, that is, the "reunification of the Korean peninsula," a movement, they call for gaining "national identity."

IV. STRUCTURE OF MOBILIZATION

The Selected Groups in Social Organization

Before elaborating the specific mobilization of the students, it is appropriate to highlight the importance of group organizations which run through much of Korean life. This theme is broader than the student movement. However, it is essential to a certain extent to understand the internal cohesive groups of the student cohort with which the networks are the dynamic facilitator in the movement.

There are three major social groups presently in South Korea: the first is the military which has profoundly influenced the present social and political system; the second is comprised of the intelligentsia and students, and the third is the business community. Since the business community is not yet directly competing for political power, conflicts with the other two social groups have not been seriously manifested.

It is the student group that has been active and determined in opposing the military involvement in national politics (all governments since 1961 have been led by former

generals).[9] It is said that primarily the intellectuals, who are anti-military and who have been alienated from the military governments, tend to instigate students to protest against governments. But there has been little attempt to prove this contention empirically.

Nevertheless, these intellectuals, along with educated and ambitious young students, are likely to be dissatisfied by the military run governments. Much of the dissatisfaction results because a highly selective military elite occupies many influential positions in the governmental bureaucracy, in semi-public corporations, and in the government affiliated parties. According to Steinberg (1988:8), "more than 55 percent of cabinet-level officials were former career military officers" during 1961-63, "42 percent in 1963-72," "32 percent in 1972-79," and "33 percent in 1979-88." From 1963 to 1986 former military officers comprised 15.8 percent of all National Assembly members. However 42 percent of committee chairman posts in the assembly were occupied by former military officers. Steinberg(1988:8-9) continues:

> Equally important, 39 percent of board directors (equivalent to vice ministers) of the central government ministries were from the military during the 1963-86 period. Also, mid-level officers were brought into the bureaucracy each year; by 1986 they totalled 686. The elimination of elected local government officials under Park Chung Hee in 1961 allowed the appointment of military figures in critical local posts. For a number of years, most

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[9] There is a popular saying that goes: "If you want to see your son become the President, send him to the Korean Military Academy."

provincial governors were from the military.

In this regard, it is plausible to infer that the favoritism toward military backgrounds in filling government posts has hindered social and political mobility opportunities for many intellectuals and enterprising young students. It can be inferred that such favoritism breeds alienation or discontent among many intellectuals and rising students.

Therefore, a major source of conflict between the military and students can be seen in the struggle for avenues to rise to positions of great authority,[10] that is, competing for power, both materially and ideally.[11] Park Chung Hee used to vehemently attack student activists and intellectuals[12] who criticized his government, implying they are at the root of political instability. On the other hand, students and those politicking intellectuals used to denounce the military regimes as morally disrespectful governments.

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[10] It can be argued that it is no coincidence that demonstrations are more frequent and active in the most prestigious universities in Seoul, such as Seoul National University, Yonse University, Korea University, Sunggyun Kwan University, etc., and that they have taken leading roles in the Korean student movement.

[11] Quee Young Kim (1983:217) presents the ironic fact that "so many of the leading figures of the movement later became spokesman for a very extreme form of authoritarianism."

[12] In 1975, Park Chung Hee expelled <u>en masse</u> the politically active professors on campus who frequently criticized the government and those sympathetic toward the student movement.

This is not to say, of course, that every member of each group engages in conflict. Membership of both groups are somewhat cross-cutting because every male Korean one way or the other directly associates with the military (military service is compulsory for all Korean men). For example, it is not an unusual scene in a demonstration to witness students throwing rocks and molotov cocktails, even as their friends, classmates, and even some of their brothers enlisted by the riot police try to subdue and disperse them. But such diffused loyalty is not common in South Korea's elite society, for Koreans tend to develop loyalties to their collectivity (particularly school loyalties) with close personal ties that have a strong bonding effect on elite society. For example, Park Chung Hee was from the second class of the Korean Military Academy (KMA); one of his prime ministers, Chung Il Kwon, and the Director of KCIA, Kim Jae Kyu (who assassinated Park), were his classmates. Park's colleagues in the 1961 coup (such as Kim Jong Pil) were from class eight. Chun Doo Hwan was from class eleven; Roh Tae Woo, the present Korean President was Chun's classmate.

Nevertheless, it is incorrect to assume that the power of the entire military is centered on a single elite group. There are several other fragmented factional groups within the military having to do with different social and geographical backgrounds. But they are less powerful than the particular group, that is, the exclusive fraternal group of Korean

Military Academy graduates. The Korean pattern of interaction is still largely operated by primary and intimate relations rather than secondary.[13] Groups are generally formed on the basis of family relations among those of similar educational and geographical backgrounds. These groups are seldom formal or institutionalized. They function rather informally with emphasis on mutual help and obligation among members by creating an abiding sense of allegiance. The members of these informal groups meet together often and exercise a great deal of power and influence on each other. Regarding this, Steinberg (1988:5) states: "Because nearly all officials went through the KMA, the military elite is probably the single most effective and cohesive organization in contemporary Korean society." Thus, Korean Military Academy graduates are closely bound to each other and play a critical role in shaping government authority.

In a similar fashion for students, school loyalties and small factional groups create close personal bonds among themselves (study circles comprised from those from high school classes and between university upper classmen and incoming freshmen) form an important student subculture on campus and become critical elements in mobilizing protest

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[13] For more detail on the Korean pattern of interaction, see a case study done by Vincent S. R. Brandt, **A Korean Village** (1971). The author provides an excellent presentation of Korean factionalism, regionalism, and interpersonal interaction.

groups. By and large, it is the peculiar characteristic of Korean people to build loyalties to their own internal group with strong emotional ties among members. These various small factional groups are also competing for hegemony within each social collectivity. Thus, in short, it is important to note that complying with collective norms and subordinating individual interests to the group one belongs to are peculiar cultural and behavioral patterns among most Koreans.

The Mobilization Process of the Students

As previously discussed, resource mobilization theory assumes that people cannot simply engage in sustained political action unless they are part of at least minimally organized groups. Thus, the theory argues that any collectivity might become a carrier of a protest group, especially when it exists segmented from the larger society. According to Oberschall(1973:ch.4), the lack of vertical integration into the larger society has the organizing potential of a collectivity. In other words, "anything which isolates a collectivity from the larger society, or the larger society from it, helps create conditions which make easier the task of changing of the collectivity (or portion thereof) from an aggregate of like-minded people to a mobilized movement"

(Rhyne, 1988:7). Also, as developed by Dahrendorf (1959: ch. VI), if a group is superimposed, it reduces the likelihood of cross-cutting memberships and thereby weakens ties of interest or loyalty to a more diverse group of people. As a result, it is "likely to increase the violence of class [group][14] conflict" (Dahrendorf, 1959:217). As Rhyne (1988:8) describes it:

> ... two groups are superimposed when the boundary of one is coterminous with that of another, when all members of Group Alpha are also members of Group Beta, and vice-versa. Such superimposition reduces the likelihood that members of any group would have different combinations of ties to other groups, thereby diffusing potential loyalties in many directions. In contrast, since the members of a superimposed collectivity have fewer conflicting loyalties, they are easier to mobilize;...

In this respect Korean students are seen as a striking example of what the resource mobilization model proposes as a collectivity easily mobilized because of the isolation from or the lack of close integration into the larger society. The large student collectivity, which is a product of modern Korean education, contributes not to only group superimposition but also segmentation, by which students are given their own social status and distinctive social roles. In other words, the modern school setting provides a segmented demographic aggregation of young people who are under lessons,

[14] Dahrendorf explains the concept "class" in terms of "the differential distribution of authority." Here I would like to use the term "group" instead of class, which is a more specific and appropriate term for this study.

separated from the rest of the world, learning the ideals of justice and democracy and being expected to always uphold these principles. Moreover, the concept of the youth of modern Korea is not the same as the youth in the Confucian era during which the age of fifteen was considered the age of entering adulthood. The period of youth has been greatly extended in the modern era.[15] So, unlike their previous generation, they have been barred from taking over adult responsibility which means that they are, in general, relatively free from the usual obligations of life and social responsibility.

But the most important thing in the structural characteristics of the student body is the ease with which they can influence each other, including a shared identity, thus providing a potential resource base for a movement. In other words, their perception of the world can be easily affected by their peers' cultural and political orientation.[16] That is, students are a congregation of a large number of cohorts who share some common characteristics and collective

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[15] There are somewhat conflicting expectations toward the youth in Korean society and family. Socially they are considered in a collective sense to be a protege, yet, at home, in many cases, they are expected to behave as an adult.

[16] For a reference, we need to give attention to Newcomb's famous Bennington study (1943) which refers to how the college life can be an important cognitive changing experience. His study reveals that the freshmen from Republican family backgrounds exposed to the liberal culture of Bennington College tended to change their political views.

sentiments created by their own subculture. Thus, according to Braungart (1984:350), given a particular set of historical circumstances, an age cohort can be "transformed into a generation when its members are aware of their uniqueness, feel a sense of solidarity, and join together to become an active force for social and political change."

Unlike American college students, Korean students are rarely allowed to transfer from one school to another; once they get into a school, they have to remain at the same school for four or more years. If one wanted to transfer, one could retake the entrance exam and start as a freshman again at another school.[17] This structural fact facilitates the process of creating a sense of belonging and of enhancing the collective consciousness of the students. It provides the subjective anchoring point of where they belong, what they are and who they are. Since they are both structurally and culturally homogeneous, it can be assumed that they cling together on campus by the presence of what Khaldun(1967) calls a "group feeling" which refers to moral and cultural superiority over another.

In addition, the student population was rapidly growing during the most turbulent period. For example, college-level

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[17] The Far Eastern Economic Review (Paul Ensor, 15, Jan. 1987:34) reports that in 1986 "besides the 700,000 high school students...," "another 100,000 were retaking the exam either after attending two-year colleges or after completing correspondence courses."

institutions in Korea from 1948 to 1960 doubled, "rising from 31 to 62" and the college student enrollment increased "from 24,000 to 97,819." Secondary schools similarly increased from 97 in 1945 to 357 in 1960. "By 1962, there were almost four times as many high school students as in 1945" (Henderson, 1968:170). In 1987, college institutions reached 115, and the number of Korean college students "reached 1.3 million, almost a fivefold increased over 1978" (Wonmo Dong, 1988:B2).

The resource-mobilization model calls attention to the degree of organizational density found within a collectivity (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). As comparable to superimposed segmentation, "that collectivity which already has a dense, viable organizational structure will transform itself more quickly into a protest group or revolutionary protagonist than will one with little or no internal organizational structure" (Rhyne, 1988:8). Given the resource base and given the dense and viable organization within the student body, it is not difficult to infer that the Korean students, as a superimposed segmented group, have a relatively easy chance to mobilize the already existing organizations within their school structure. It is very important to recognize that the very organizational structure of the student body, mobilized frequently by the Syngman Rhee regime for anti-communist rallies during the 1950s, ironically turned against that regime at a particular historical and political event, the unfair presidential election of March 15, 1960.

Quee-young Kim's study about the 1960 student uprising clearly implies that these organizational structures had helped enormously in facilitating the movement. The demographically isolated and physically mobile student body was already available at any time for political and social mobilization by any factions. The only things that it needed were the right cause and the leader for them to mobilize their resources. For example, the small number of students in Taegu protesting the unjust election in 1960 captured the attention of the mass media and were portrayed "as a source of moral purity and national consciousness" (Kim, 1983:211), particularly when their actions were viewed against the historical tradition of the heroic action of students against Japan. It seems that this mass media focus accelerated the process of mobilization, winning support from other student majorities of other parts of the country.

However, given the latent cause to mobilize, the elected student chairman of the College of Political Economy at Korea University in Seoul, Yi Se-ki was not personally interested in mobilizing the students for demonstrations; he was rather afraid of the potential risk of his involvement in it. But he and his officers of the student association felt a great deal of pressure from a student body that was indeed concerned. The following questions were asked of Yi Se-ki by some students: "Don't you think that we should do something? Otherwise, we will be nothing. How can we face the people?

The fate of our nation is at stake" (Recitation from Q.Y. Kim, 1983:77). Yi wrote later reflecting upon the situation prior to the demonstration on April 18, 1960.

> Everytime I ran into these guys, I was forced into a corner to answer these questions. I would mumble a bit and avoid the situation as best I could. But they were persistent and even threatening. I was afraid that they would rough me up if I didn't do something very soon. (Recitation from Quee-young Kim, 1983:77)

One might possibly wonder: What do other organizations, such as labor unions, political parties, peasant collectivities, other independent interest groups do in that situation of political crisis? As I mentioned earlier, when we look at the political processes of South Korea historically, union activity and other kinds of organizational political activities were severely suppressed, and, under the powerful dogma anti-communism, all too often were viewed as pro-Soviet (Henderson, 1968 and Cumings, 1986). South Korean governments have not been inclined to tolerate any independent organizations, particularly those groups such as farmers, laborers, teachers, etc. that are likely to oppose government policies on behalf of their occupational interests. An enduring pattern of repression was thus established, and it served to weaken political opposition. The result is that society has experienced a relative lack of organized interest groups, except in the commercial and industrial sectors. Since the labor unions and political groups were repressed, harassed, and outlawed, student groups have gained a

relatively more important political role since then.

Due to the continuing historical role in political opposition, the Korean students have obtained a recognized identity, that is as the "nation's conscience." This label has assigned to them as the patriotic voice of the country. This kind of fame has traditionally ridden on their role as the morally upright in the Confucian era; as the heroes of the struggle under Japanese rule; and as the advocates of democratic ideals in domestic politics. This historical symbolic definition of moral purity[18] has given the students the privilege of providing support or criticism of the central government.

Furthermore, this shared identity as bearers of the "nation's conscience," acquired through the historical processes, continually imposes upon the individual a self-definition that coincides with the symbolic and historical experiences. And the students are, in the eyes of others, expected to maintain the identity and to reconstruct the historical meanings creatively in the communal context by assembling potential resources. This labeling effect, in my opinion, greatly works to facilitate the movement. One protester at Seoul National University responded to an

[18] Henderson (1988:5) contends that the traditional-ridden elitism (Confucian origin) among students is one of the important abiding themes of the student movement in Korea along with two other themes. Those are "nationalism" and "equity."

American reporter: "Because we're students, we have the privilege of being involved in politics." "We must do our duty to reform society." Most Korean students like himself believe that they have "a responsibility to push government and society" (Recitation from Gittelsohn, June 24, 1987:33-34; underlines are mine to emphasize his taken-for-granted assumption of "weness"). They see themselves as carrying on a long tradition of dissent to the spoils of power. This shared sense of identity, formed by historical processes and culturally rooted into the structure, in turn, motivates individuals to participate in the movement.

Because of this shared sense of cultural identity, attempts to mobilize the student movement have been relatively easy for the leaders, albeit it was loosely organized. The mobilization efforts have been made mostly through the formal student organizations. During the 1960s and most of the 1970s, there were no standing movement organizations separate from the formal body of student associations. Most demonstrations were organized by the duly elected student leaders, and the causes were based on the contemporary political issues. Thus, the characteristic of the student movement was more or less temporary and somewhat transitory; their ideology was not yet distinctively articulated. Their zeal was fundamentally oriented toward reform rather than revolution, but it was throughout a basically anti-government movement. In other words, when facing the government's

repressive measures and the issue became out of date, the movement weakened and soon disappeared. The student leader, who was often duly elected with strong support from his friendship circles, could easily pull resources and facilitate the demonstration movement without extensive brooding over long term tactical and effective planning. Viewed as a representative of the student body, the elected student president has been ascribed a symbolic status to be a leader of the student movement as well, one who should be able to carry on the tradition of historical identity. He then, armed with moral ideas, simply mobilizes the existing formal student organizations, manufacturing the cause to rise according to the issue that was perceived to be important. Once a person succeeded in successfully mobilizing a number of student followers, he tended to receive attention from both the government and the opposition group. In some cases, the government, often through either coaxing or threatening by the KCIA, allegedly used to offer the student leader a job or bribe in an attempt to nullify the movement circle. Few actually took the offer, and some refused it and chose a path in pursuance of a career in an opposition political party.[19]

Returning to the dynamics of group life, informal small

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[19] This is a moot point to debate. However, it can be developed into a hypothesis that the motivation of the student leader is to establish the basis of his political career after graduation. The source of data comes from interviews and the personal experiences of observing a circle of movement group when I was in Korea before 1985.

groups, fraternal friendship circles, are pervasive in a peculiar way within any collectivity of Korean society. There are undoubtedly several small factions on campus who are competing with each other to put their own member in the presidential post of the student government in order to take over hegemony of power on campus. At the least, they try to gain influence upon it by federating their groups and by attracting the normative support from the mass student body. Meanwhile, they can effectively mobilize the resources whenever they need and want to. All too often, out of friendship circles and social networks, a student leader duly elected with the support of his members to be a representative of the student government becomes the leader of the movement as well. Kim (1983:207) shows how these small groups of friendship networks in 1960 facilitated the movement and succeeded unexpectedly in toppling the Syngman Rhee government.

However, there were times of serious trials for the formal student organizations in Korea when the government put campuses under systematic surveillance by the secret police and banned all autonomous student organizations. The harsher control over the student movement began at the so-called

Yushin[20] reform measure of 1972, which banned virtually all opposition including student organizations and demonstrations. Since then, the "Student Defence Corps" which the government set up had become the only legally recognized campus student organization. The repressive measure had continued and intensified until Park's assassination in October 1979. For example, one unit of underground students in 1974 issued a "Declaration on the People, Nation, and Democracy," and were arrested with other intellectuals and clergy who were supposedly connected to those students. Surprisingly, among those, several students received a death sentence (however, they were released later).

During the early 1980s, except the spring of 1980 (a short while after Park's death), the student movement was again put under repressive measures of the Chun Doo Hwan government. The autonomous campus student organizations were disbanded to be replaced by ones controlled by the government and administration. Moreover, "college presidents and administrators were required to suppress student activism - through suspension, expulsion, and otherwise - and were discharged if they failed to do so" (MacDonald, 1988:92). Even the officially approved social activities on campus were

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[20] The human rights report issued by Asia Watch describes the Yushin system as "the style of traditional monarchy." Park Chung Hee "ignored the legislative process and the National assembly altogether and adopted the tactic of issuing decrees" (Asia Watch, January 1986:16).

severely restricted and regulated. The Asia Watch (1986: 93-4) reported on its control that the government used:

> ...spies and informers in the guise of students and maintained a police presence on campus with both uniformed and plainclothes men stationed outside administrative and other offices on campus. The government set up its own controlled campus student organization, the student corps for National Defence (Hakto hoguktan) right after the Kwangju incident in 1980 and forbade the free organization of any other independent student associations. All decisions of the Hoguktan including budget were controlled by the Student Guidance Committee (Hakkyo Chido Wiwonhoe), a branch of the all-university central Guidance Committee. No student with any record of participation in a demonstration or disciplinary action could be elected head of the Hoguktan.

The Washington Post (June 4, 1981) reported on the campus scene in the early 1980s as follows:

> At some points on the campus of Seoul National University, there were more agents than there were students.

Under these harsh measures, the movement circles went completely underground to avoid government and professorial control. They settled into cells - so called underground "study-circles" which have existed as the unit "in which social issues, radical and illicit ideologies, interpretations of Korean society, economy and history are explored and plots against the authorities cooked and hatched" (Henderson, 1988:14). This unit seems rather natural, as Henderson (1988:14) points out, to "a small-group-oriented Korean society." It is also important to note that the various legally approved circle (club) activities as an extra-

curricular program on campus are part of the student culture which have persisted throughout much of the history of the student movement and influenced it greatly. The study circle - whether underground or legalized - functions as a network of support systems among many students in which they can easily find their own friendship groups.[21] Thus, the on-campus subculture of circle activity is rigorously maintained by the majority of students. According to surveys conducted at Korea University in 1983 and 1985:

> Nearly half the students said they spent their free time at school with fellow course members and classmates; a third spent it alone, mostly for study. Only 2 percent spent it with members of the opposite sex. A little more than a quarter of the students said they spent their after-school time with friends and classmates; nearly the same number studied in the library; about one in eight went home, and about the same number went to "circle" (equivalent to club or society) gathering or activities on campus. (Macdonald, 1988:89)

Those students who went underground were or became radical and maintained well-organized secret networks, through which they recruited and indoctrinated new members as well as organized small-scale but tactical demonstrations. According

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[21] The campus experience is quite unstable to many young students, since many of them come from traditional family backgrounds which are very intimate but at the same time authoritarian. In the rapidly changing society, many young people confront a generation gap within the family. This brings a lack of communication with their authoritarian father. Also moving into the impersonal and egalitarian, somewhat freer campus setting, they confront a sudden personal crisis. As a result, it is rather natural to many students to join a small group cell in order to gain a support system from their peers. At the same time the campus setting provides a good place to meet like-minded people.

to a report in 1981:

> Sporadic small-scale protests continue to erupt on several of Seoul's college campuses but the wave of larger demonstrations that spread over them last week seems to have subsided under heavy government pressure and warnings that the universities may be closed down. (The Washington Post, June 4, 1981)

Despite the effort of the Chun government to terminate student unrest, the new form of small-scale tactical demonstrations has surfaced instead of a large-scale mobilization. It seems to me the trend of underground student networking changed the course of the Korean student movement in the 1980s. The Chun government apparently failed destroy the small group communication network of the student body. The students' protest mobilizations in the 1980s have become far more effective tactically and better articulated ideologically than previous ones in the 1960s and 70s.

One might then wonder how new members were recruited into the underground movement circles in the highly risk-involved circumstances under government pressure? Many new members seem to be recruited through the connection linked to one's juniors in high school.[22] However, the other conventional way is going through the departmental or legally approved circle activities. For example, there are various kinds of social gatherings on campus, particularly the legalized circle meetings which are operated to stimulate student's extra-

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[22] This topic needs to have an in-depth interview research. My description can be an overview of a part of the recruitment process.

curricular activities. Such circles vary from philosophy to sports. These are, to name a few: folk song study, Kant study, mask dance study, classics study, science study, traditional art study, poets, guitar players, mountain climbers, theatrical performers, existentialists, soccer players, etc.

Among those circles, some operate underground systems that intensively train in a separate course a small group of members who are politically like-minded. The new members are normally recruited during the open membership training sessions or seminar presentations. Often, outstanding figures who are politically concerned and who have good friendship circle are likely to be recruited by their senior members. The new members are accepted into a small clandestine group raised with a strong sense of obligation and comradeship. They share the same feelings, study, and discuss together various topics to build solid ideological orientation and to acquire organizational tactics as well. The ideological training for the members is supposed to be toward praxis rather than metaphysical. When the trained individual reaches the third year, he normally has to choose one of two alternatives: whether to go for activism or for training new members. Supposedly, he goes out to form a new study-circle. In actuality, he is responsible for nurturing his group to

maintain the tightest membership.[23] Each group joins the special membership training that is carefully conducted with massive readings of leftist literature, consolidating their ideology in which each member knows only his own superior and a few intimate comrades.[24] They also participate in the open membership training for a larger number of students from departments or legalized circles, which is offered during the vacations, often occurring in rural areas with the intention of raising consciousness of farmers and helping them to organize. The Chun government, however, banned the summer activity because of their connection to the farmers.

The failure of the Chun government to crush the small group informal structure of the student movement circle may be attributed to the culturally inherited small-group-oriented nature of Korean society. The police reported in 1986 that there were 72 such underground cells at 22 universities in Seoul. Yet most of them were only "under the umbrella of Chamintu and Minmintu, two radical underground organizations which were formed in mid-1986" (McBeth, 1987:31-3). Nevertheless, the new trend of forming underground cells was not limited to on-campus. That is, the students formed

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[23] Among students this cell is called a "family" or a "team."

[24] They also operate a system in which each study-circle dispatches a member to other group to connect cells in an effort to improve the solidarity of the movement. The leading group in mobilizing demonstrations among these study-circles on campus is often called the "head family."

connections with Christian churches and other religious organizations in order to avoid repression on campus. This tie with religious groups allowed students safer places to gather off campus and somewhat better protection from the police. In addition, this underground movement was widely accompanied in the movement circle with the so-called "conscientization movement" (Uisick-Hwa Undong) which may refer to a movement to raise the consciousness of individuals.

When the government relaxed its controls over students in 1984 (the so-called "Campus Autonomy Measure"), these segmented, dissociated circles banded together to form a federal group; for each had "a reason to join with the others to form a federation representing the large group as a whole" (Olson, 1965:63). For example, on April 17, 1985, the National Federation of Student Association (Chonhakyon) was organized out of this study-circle cell network. Under the federation, the political standing organization, Sammintu was set up to coordinate the effective demonstration movement through mobilizing underground and semi-underground small study-circle cells linked with inter-campus cooperatives. The revived autonomous student organizations on campus also brought greater strength and faster and effective mobilization. Since then, the frequency of demonstration has been remarkably increased. According to the Ministry of Culture and Information announcement in Oct. 20, 1985, "419

demonstrations had occurred involving 76,000 students from 71" universities since March. There also had been "255 labor disputes from January to October" (NACHRK, **Korea '88**, 1988:37).

The key student demonstration occurred in May 1985 when seventy-three students from five universities in Seoul staged a three-day sit-in at the U.S. Information Service building, demanding that the U.S. issue an apology for what they called "U.S. involvement in the Kwangju incident"(NACHRK, 1988:36). This was a tactically successful protest to draw public and world attention (through mass media) to the sensitive political issue of South Korea. Embarrassed by this protest, the authority of the government responded with a thorough investigation of the student federation with the intention of wiping out the leading activists. As a result, Sammintu was disbanded through the arrests of its leading members.

Even if its leadership is decimated by arrests and the organization is destroyed by frequent government suppression, successors survive from the underground study-circle cells. For example, the Sammintu, destroyed after the three-day occupation of the United States Information Service building, was followed by the two new movement organizations, the

Chamintu and the Minmintu.[25] They soon engaged in an intensive ideological argument. Competing to attract the support from the masses, the two groups became increasingly radicalized. They also competed to put their members in the presidential post of student governments. However, because of their radicalized character, both groups failed to obtain strong support from the mass body of students. For example, during the 1987 election at Seoul National University for the student associations, the candidates with revolutionary slogans were not able to receive many votes.[26] The Chamintu acknowledged this, and changed to more moderate slogans for direct national presidential elections and formed the "Patriotic Students' Pan-National Federation for Struggle against Foreign Powers and Dictatorship." On the other hand, the Minmintu rigidly maintained radical agitation advocating to form the "People's Constitution Assembly." As a result, some member universities left the Minmintu organization. Under less radical agitation, the movement by Chamintu successfully led the major demonstrations by gaining great support from middle class citizens as well in June, 1987, and these in turn led to the major change of the ruling party's platform on June 29, 1987.

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[25] The headquarter of Chamintu was known to exist in Seoul National University, and the Minmintu was in Sunggyun Kwan University. Both have member universities, however, individual members through small groups are scattered around all campuses.

[26] A report from "The Christian Institute for the study of Justice and development," Seoul, Korea, March 1987.

In the wake of Roh's political relaxation, the student movement has shifted from the democratization issue to reunification and anti-Americanism. The Chamintu and the Minmintu organizations have been succeeded presently by other different regionally associated groups.[27] However, under the banner of national reunification, the student activists seem to agree in uniting under the "National Federation of General Student Councils," formed in August 1988.

One of the distinctive characteristics of the 1980s' student movement is that the students allied with intellectuals, workers, farmers and other religious groups to form a strong opposing force to the governments. Needless to say, the major demonstration of June 1987 was a product of this alliance. However, it was more than one group with others: It was accompanied with the movement of the so-called "Into the Workers" (Shim, 1986:36). Student activists secretly crept into industrial plants to become assembly-line workers in an effort to organize labor unions. They generally obtained employment by disguising their educational backgrounds on the application forms. Their numbers (including both college graduates and expellees) in 1986 were "conservatively estimated to be about 1,500." "In 1985, 321

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[27] For example, the Minmintu was succeeded by the Sogonchu and the Chamintu by Sochongyon. In addition, various regional federations were formed: for instance, Chunnam, Chunbuk, Chunju, Wonkwang, and Woosuk Universities formed a "Honam Student Federations."

'disguised employees' (former student activists) were fired by their employers. During the first five months of 1986 alone, 350 student activists-turned-workers were dismissed from their jobs for having misrepresented themselves by underreporting their educational backgrounds on application forms" (Wonmo Dong, 1987:247) Those students were often accused of being communist labor organizers by the government. As the NACHRK[28] (Oct. 28, 1986) report states about a case of one labor organization:

> The organization is said to have been formed at a meeting of fifteen persons at the home of an expelled Seoul National University student, Kim Son-Tae, last June 14, to discuss organizing workers at the Kuro Industrial Complex in Seoul. The movement rapidly spread, according to the prosecutor, so that by the end of August it included 20 "cells" with 101 organizers, who "planned to organize a Marxist-Leninist party with the ultimate purpose of bringing about a socialist revolution." As evidence, the prosecutor said they had discovered "a thesis on Leninist methods of organizing labor."[29]

Over the years, the Korean student movement has become violent and its slogans much more radicalized; its ideology nurtures the potential for subversion. Unlike their previous movement, it has become distinctive in that some students are far more radical than others. This radicalism has raised concerns among many people, particularly among the older

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[28] The North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea (NACHRK) issued biweekly reports on the situation of human rights in Korea.

[29] It has been illegal to possess and read Marx or other communist literature in South Korea. However, this censorship is now more relaxed.

generation. Their ideological cry reveals that their perception of the world is distinctively different from that of the preceding generation. This not only segregates the older generation but also limits the support from the body of students. Such objectionable radicalism landed many students in jail and many other students were expelled from school. In late 1986, according to a government report, of the 3,400 South Korean political prisoners, 85 percent were students. From 1980 to 1987, it is estimated that 124,600 students were expelled (however, most of them were returned later) from four-year universities due to involvement in the student movement (Henderson, 1988:1).

Fearing for his safety one student says, "I didn't go to the demos because I have to think of my self-interest." "If you're in a demo, it's good for social conditions - but not for your future. The government investigates you" (Recitation from Gittelsohn, July 1, 1987:28). Another student responded: "I was too scared. If you got arrested you might not be able to get a job, or you might get sent to the army"[30] (Recitation

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[30] In an attempt to segregate the student activists from the ordinary student body, the Chun government introduced a program, so-called the "Greening Project" which had forcibly conscripted some of identified activists into the army in order to depoliticize them. According to the government, 465 student activists were subjected to this program between May 1980 and the end of 1983. Among 465 student inductees six were found dead. The causes were unknown, but, according to the army report, five of them had committed suicide and one was killed accidentally. This case was widely used to provoke agitation on campus. (Wonmo Dong, 1986:239)

from Brant, spring 1988:22) Evidently most of students are concerned with their self-interest and many of them do not even want to take an explicit stand.

Contrary to the majority of students, one student leader at Yonse University, who is considered a moderate, told a New York Times reporter in an interview that "I am not afraid of going to jail. As a student leader, it's something I take for granted." The reporter asked again "Will you have difficult getting a job?" Said the student, "It would be an honor if I didn't get a job because of my activities. I will be doing the same thing I am now, fighting for democracy" (Kristof, August 2, 1987). Approximately 5-10 percent of the students are considered to be activists. However, it may be largely the cultural factor that such minority students can influence the rest of the majority (40-60 percent) of students.

As seen in the above statements, a lot of student activists have evidently risked their careers for the movement.[31] How could some students be bold enough to risk their lives? Assuming that human action is rational reflecting the econo-cultural environment in balancing costs and benefits, minimizing the former and maximizing the latter,

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[31] The students who are once blacklisted for joining the ranks of activism are usually left with little choice other than to become revolutionaries. As Shim Jea Hoon (1986:36-41) puts it, "Harsh reprisals aimed at critics, such as deprivation of jobs or expulsion from universities, have pushed some oppositionists to becoming fulltime revolutionaries."

a question must be asked how they can risk their promising career right at its threshold? What is in their heads? To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the role of ideology in depth.

V. ROLE OF IDEA, IDEOLOGY, AND MYTH

In discussing the role of ideology, I am not intending to argue that voluntarism (i.e., political consciousness), as neo-Marxists (Marcuse, 1972) assert, is a determining factor in revolutionary movement. Nor do I intend to attempt to resolve the intellectual controversy over this issue as to whether ideology causes revolution or simply adds to it. What I am trying to do in this chapter is to observe that ideas do give focus and direction to the continuing movement. Ideology is important, as Rhyne (1988:9) points out, "in aiding a protest group to spell out its ends, to name its enemies, and (most important of all) to define itself to itself." Collective behavior theorists (Smelser, 1963) assert that there can be street riots and other forms of collective behaviors, but, without the idea about who it is, where it is going, who stands to thwart its path, the collective behaviors end up as random outbursts of unfocused anger. Therefore, Rhyne argues that the ideology is a pull factor that facilitates the movement into the following three ways:

> ...(1) It gives focus and direction to any frustrations or concerns a collectivity may have, thereby bringing some unity of perception. That is, it facilitates the process whereby the diverse concerns and rages of disparate members can be melded into a limited number of shared feelings and be made to focus on common ends and common enemies.
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> ...(2) It facilitates the process of clearly separating the "us" from the "them." Armed with moral absolutes and stark dichotomies, a member of a protest group can give far more unstintingly of his or her time, and possibly life, and is able to see the opponent as undeserving of forgiveness or mercy. Without these processes operating in some kind of joint, communal way neither the co-ordinated actions nor the lethal challenges so necessary to violent conflict would be possible.
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> ...(3) In Sorel's illuminating conception, (1950) it is in the realm of ideas that one can identify the Myth without which no great deeds, "heroic action" as he put it, are possible. To him, the Myth makes it possible to link individual goals to a single task, to translate abstract ideals into a concrete path of action, and to energize all with the belief that the world will be transformed if all will follow the single, common call to action. The Myth is thus not primarily a summary of beliefs or a diagnosis of what is wrong with the world; it is a design meant to convince the believer that great things will happen if the common action is pursued. In his time, it was the call to a General Strike that Sorel saw as the Myth which would unite the French proletariat in the transformation of their world. (Rhyne, 1988:10)

In Q.Y. Kim's view, the real cause of the student uprising in 1960 was not the motivation of conspiratorial ideology but primarily by "the disjunction between the content of education and the criteria of legitimacy" (1983:209). In other words, the students rose against the Syngman Rhee government "for its failure to live up to the ideals of liberal democracy" (Kim, 1983:210). Thus, according to him,

because of this lagging condition, students were angered. So the uprising was purely spontaneous, i.e., it was not planned ahead. For example, the 1960 student uprising initiated with a small group of students, a network of friends, in Taegu who mobilized the first student revolt on February 28, 1960. They rebelled simply against the unfair order of the Commissioner of Education (of Kyungbuk Province) to keep school open on Sunday, which was an obvious attempt by a government officer to keep the students away from the planned opposition party's Sunday campaign rally for the coming presidential election on March 15, 1960 (Q.Y. Kim, 1983:36-40).

It is obvious to me that there were no interuniversity plans and national coordinations at the threshold. No student group premeditated their protests: i.e., there were no clear common objectives fueled by subversive ideas. However, that does not mean we must view it as a purely spontaneous event as Kim asserts. It is certain that small groups in friendship circles and classmates carefully planned to mobilize their student body. Evidently, these small circle of already concerned students took pre-existing ideas and made potential participants not only aware of them but made those ideas meaningful to them. Those ideas, such as academic freedom, liberty, and democracy, were extensively utilized in order to justify the moral cause of their revolt, to spell out their goal, and, more importantly, to provide the picture of a wishful state of affairs. As Crane Brinton (1963:49)

suggests, "ideas are always a part of the pre-revolutionary situation, ...No ideas, no revolution." The students in the initiation stage formulated their ideas as follows:

> Our basic liberty is in danger. The freedom to rest from the week's labor on Sunday -- the most fundamental right of mankind all over the civilized world -- is now to be taken away from us. (Q. Y. Kim, 1983:41)

It is apparent that they capitalized on these pre-existing ideas to facilitate their protest movement. Without ideas, the revolt follows "in haphazard eruptions of unfocused anger" (Rhyne, 1988:9). Ideas provide a blueprint for the continuing movement. Undoubtedly, it has been evident that the further the Korean student movement goes, the better the ideology becomes articulated and subversive.

But the most important fact is that students emotionally embrace some mythical qualities in their cultural legends of the movement within the country's history. In other words, they give a noble interpretation on the historical role of students. They feel that they succeed in acting out of a nationalistic, patriotic tradition. For example, the first student revolt at Taegu in 1960 received extensive media attention because two days later was the day commemorating the March First Liberation Movement against Japanese colonial power which occurred in 1919, at which many students were sacrificed. The 1919 Liberation struggle was symbolically meaningful in the minds of Koreans, invoking the spirit of patriotic movement. Thus, regarding the student revolt against

the order to keep school open on Sunday, the media portrayed this incident as a continuing symbol of the patriotic young students' struggle for freedom and justice. In a similar way, the students of Korea University in Seoul, after being attacked by a gang mobilized by the ruling party during the demonstration, received extensive media attention propitious to the student side. This media coverage seemed to give renewed momentum to the Korean student movement in 1960.

Seen from the process of the April revolution[32], there is no evidence that any group or organization plotted to topple the ruling regime and to take over power. In other words, there was no ideological conspiracy believable to the protesters before action was provided, except a symbolic interpretation of the role of students by mass media. The students simply utilized the pre-existing ideas, justice, freedom, and democracy to express the justification for their collective action, and furthermore equipped with "a noble interpretation of the historical process" (Oberschall,

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[32] The way one defines the revolution varies according to what perspective one has. There is a wide range of controversy as to whether the event should be called a revolution or not. Some call it, the April revolution; others, the April 19th Righteous Uprising; or still others, simply the Sa-il-gu (April 19th). Q.Y. Kim (1983:8) defines the event simply the "revolt" "because it had neither strong leadership nor unifying organization or ideology." It is self-evident that there was neither a plot by any organization or group to gain power nor significant transformation of social structures with class upheaval. However, it brought the collapse of the ruling regime which seems to form an important part of a revolutionary movement.

1973:181). However, as we have seen, the mythic quality combining the old historical moral traditions and new Western ideas were utilized by the students in order to facilitate the movement. The Korea University students issued a leaflet before their action:

> We all know that the tradition of our school is a glorious one. Our school fought against the Japanese for our national independence! Such a feat one does not forget! We must not permit our noble tradition to be blemished. We cannot sit idly by while such injustice is perpetrated. (Q.Y. Kim, 1983:39)

Again combining with a set of moral ideas and the noble interpretation of historical processes, any collectivity can be mobilized into the mortal conflict. It is not the matter of the cogent ideas or existing historical and cultural facts; it is rather the translation of them into some kind of believable plan of action. As Sorel (1950:46) pointed out, men move to action by myths rather than facts.

> The mind of man is so constituted that it can not remain content with the mere observation of facts, but always attempts to penetrate into the inner reason of things.

These mythic elements pertaining to the abstract ideas help men to move to action and, at the same time, the complete system of ideas in their heads works to diagnose and evaluate the moral evil and name its enemies, to offer "a counter-vision in waiting which lights the future," (Rhyne, 1983:16) and to call to that heroic action which leads from today's gloomy world to tomorrow's shining Utopian society. As Sorel (1950:41-2) puts it,

> ...men who are participating in a great social movement always picture their coming action as a battle in which their cause is certain to triumph.

Armed with moral ideas, the Korean students are not hesitant to judge the reality and convince themselves that they are going to change the world. According to Sorel, this is some kind of illusion rather than reality; that is, it is a myth. But the important point to keep in mind is that myth is neither primarily a set of beliefs nor simply an intellectual or philosophical diagnosis of ills in the world; it is rather an emotional phenomenon that calls the believer to action. In other words, "the myths are", according to Sorel, "not description of things, but expressions of a determination to act" (1950:50). It is the unconscious factors complete with rational ideology that "convince the believer that great things will happen if the common action is pursued" (Rhyne, 1988:10).

In this respect, we can discover great amounts of mythic elements out of the 1980s' Korean student movement. Because of the myths, it is possible for the student activists to dedicate themselves to the political struggle in spite of their risking promising careers. Without question, the Sa-il-gu (April 19th) revolution also bore a new myth, and added to the existing myths.

> Offsprings of the April Revolution! Descendants of Tonghak Revolution[33] and the March First Movement! Let us rise up! (from a leaflet issued at Yonse University, Nov. 18, 1981)

Applying a set of moral values, they also identify who are villains and who are heroes. Then, the common enemy becomes apparent:

> Chun Doo Hwan has committed too many outrages! He is worse than a dog or pig! ...Chun Doo Hwan has shown for all to see that he is a genocidal murderer and he will go down in history for his immorality. (from the "Declaration of Democratic Students," 1981: source anonymous)

This clear separation of the evil from the good helps the movement to bring some unity of perception, that is "solidarity." These fashions have helped to shape the nature of the following Korean student movement, and have continued to inspire the participants in it.

In comparison to the 1960s and 70s, one finds a stark difference in the 1980s' student movement. The difference is conspicuous violence. The students in the 1980s are apparently far more violent than in the 1960s and 70s. Why? This question needs to be viewed in terms of ideological differences. Actually, in most cases, political violence is initiated by military or police action. Generally demonstrations turned violent at the moment "when the authorities intervened to stop an illegal but nonviolent action" (Zimmermann, 1983:126).

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[33] An abortive peasant revolution in 1893, during the time of Yi dynasty's disintegration.

However, it seems to me that the students in the 1980s use violence as a tactical means to draw the media attention in an attempt to publicize their movement goals. Furthermore, the violence also results from their morally absolute ideas. Unlike their forebears in the 1960s and 70s, the students in the 1980s have become an "ideologically cohesive and tactically effective force" (Dong, 1988:B2). They claim in their appraisal of the previous movement that "the student movement up to the late 1970s was a romantic one, simply protested against the dictatorship under the names of freedom and democracy" (Ill Song Chung, 1985:5), which means that they were naively optimistic about political reform within the system. They declare that the year of 1980 was the end of romanticism in the student movement. The students view that the goal of the April student revolution in 1960 has not been achieved yet: it is still in the process. They believe that they are successors of the April movement and feel an obligation to complete it, which implies that they are determined to make real and violent revolution by their own will. This means that they now have their own ideology and are prepared to struggle for it. Thus, the student movement of the 1980s has become self-consciously theoretical in ideology better articulated than before and more concrete in issues. Despite little changes in the structure of the movement, this ideological maturation in the 1980s tends to reveal a stark difference from the previous student movement.

Student activists in the 1980s, having reinterpreted Korea's history, believe that the masses have been exploited and oppressed under both the Japanese and their authoritarian Korean successor, and that "the people must be liberated from an exploitative economic system which is dependent on comprador-monopolized capital" (Henderson, 1988:17). Students also believe that Korean business leaders, whom they see as being supported by massive foreign capital, "maintain a low-wage policy and an agricultural import policy [low-grain price] which benefits only themselves" (Henderson, 1988:17). They are convinced that present anomalies of structure in Korean society have been affected by this process. The students believe that the true barrier to the democratization of Korean society is the comprador-bureaucratic capitalism which was primarily imposed by foreign powers -- i.e., neo-colonial powers. By virtue of the foreign imperialistic capitalism, Korea has failed to secure her national sovereignty and establish a self-reliant economy. The result of an economic system dependent upon the neo-colonial capitalism is not only anti-democratic but also anti-reunification of Korea. Under this economic system, according to the students:

> ...the ruling coalition (the military, monopoly capital and bureaucrats) dependent on foreign powers

attempts to construct the permanent Minjung[34] exploitation system and to make the stable self reproduction. Therefore, the basic structure of the present Korean society can be understood as the state monopolistic capitalism dependent on foreign powers in economic realm and as the anti-democratic, authoritarian, military fascism in political realm; to sum up, it can be understood as the twofold

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[34] Minjung is a Korean word, which literally means the mass of the people ("min" can be interpreted as "people" and "jung" as the "mass"). However, the concept has strong historical meaning. The concept was initially used by a nationalist Buddhist monk during the Japanese colonial period. The concept was originally meant to describe "mass"; "first, the people who don't have sovereignty under the colonial system and under the situation where feudal monarchy withered away. Second, the people, nevertheless, who are dedicated to achieve their sovereignty by struggling against the colonial system." Presently, this concept is widely used in south Korea. Dr. Han Wan Sang in his book, **Minjung Sociology** (Seoul: ChongRo Books Inc., 1984) argues that the concept of minjung differs from the Marxian concept of the proletariate class. According to him, it is a broader category of people which is determined not only by the mode of production but also by the political processes. Thus, it includes all the alienated ruled who are economically exploited, politically oppressed, and socially discriminated. It seems to me that much of his emphasis is put on the overtly subjective criteria, so that it is still very vaguely and imprecisely defined. However, the way in which the students have defined it may be useful to understand their ideological rhetoric. According to them, Minjung is the class coalition formed by labor, peasantry, the urban poor, as well as the urban middle and lower class. It only excludes the class of comprador monopoly capitalists, comprador bureaucrats, and the comprador military group. As they put it:

> The concept "Minjung in the Minjung-democracy" should be grasped as the main revolutionary agent of the world history, as a historical conception and as a class coalition. The Korean social structure is the product of the dependent industrialization process. As a result, the social conflict does not take the singular shape of the capitalist-labor conflict, but the reiterated complex shape of the conflict between monopoly capital and informal section, the conflict between monopoly capital and agricultural section and the like. In this sense, "Minjung" is the class coalition at the core of labor, peasantry, and the urban poor. (What is 3-Min Ideology? 1985:8)

> Minjung exploitation system. (What's the 3-Min Ideology? 1985:6)

The following are views of the students on the internal products of structural process of capitalism in south Korea:

> Generally, in the process of the capitalist formation (the construction of capitalist state - the creation of capitalist mode of production), the state distorts the civil society and serves as a Total Capitalist. In particular, the authoritarian system constructed by process of the dependent industrialization, namely the military fascist[35] system dependent on foreign powers complements the weakness of the capital, and at the same time contrives to exclude the Minjung section (labor, peasantry, the urban poor, and the urban middle and lower class) politically. (What's the 3-Min Ideology? 1985:5)

The students believe that the economic development that industrialization has brought is actually a deformed one, and it only benefits a handful of elites in Korean society. Thus, they must convert their ideological path from "Liberal Democracy" to "Minjung Democracy." The "Minjung Democracy" implies a state of complete transformation of political and social structures with class upheaval from below (minjung) into a politically and economically equal society. A strong abiding hope of students is that if the united minjung overthrow the handful who wield evil power, it will lead to

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[35] The students define "fascism" as "the system which obliterates democracy, oppresses the people with weapons, and deprives them of their natural rights (in a political sense), and which puts the people under the screw in order to preserve the vested interests of a few privileged groups (in a economic sense). (from a leaflet of "Declaration on the Current National Situation," The Democratic Student of Seoul National University, March 1981)

a future earthly utopia. As they perceive the situation:

> It is more than twenty years that a dictatorial regime, enemy of democracy, has stood over people with the aid of the force of guns and swords, in the guise of "Liberal Democracy." Until the middle of the 70's the student movement called for the recovery of "Liberal Democracy." But the time of frustration has been too long. During the long time of set-backs and frustration, the color of liberal democracy has faded. In the 80s, the students have with great effort given fresh colors to the tired and faded democracy. And this democracy has been called minjung democracy. (Student's Reaction to the Public Prosecutors' Interim Report of the Investigation of "Sammintu" - committee, 1986:4)

Since the Sammintu student movement organization had professed three basic goals: liberation of the masses (minjung), attainment of democracy (minju), and the reunification of Korea (minjok), the main rhetoric behind most of the demonstrations represents democratization (Minju wha) and reunification (Tongil). It is the students' belief that to make Korea a democratic society is to move one step further to reunifying the nation. As these goals are achieved, the liberation of minjung will naturally follow. However, they discover with reinterpreting history that the dictatorial regime is not the sole enemy; for them the real enemy is behind the undemocratic regime, that is, imperial capitalist power. Therefore, they think that in order to achieve democracy and unification in Korea, they must struggle against foreign imperialistic powers. Most of their arguments revolve around their perception of Japan's and America's role in Korean history, particularly toward the United States. As one

student publication puts it:

> We understand clearly that the United States is the basic enemy who prevented us from achieving democracy, both through the Kwangju incident and in the presidential election. Therefore, we see clearly that democracy can not flourish in this land until we are freed from the United States. Not a single soul ventures to assert any more that the United States is the guardian of world peace or the motherland of democracy. ...The United States is precisely the power that acted as the chief instigator to divide our fatherland, precisely the power that stage-managed dictatorship in this country....(Young Pupils Devote Their Hearts to the Proud Korean Minjung, 1988)

The students tend to believe that no progressive change is possible until American troops and political influences are eliminated. In short, the major blame is fixed upon the foreign imperialistic powers, more precisely on the United States, for the structural anomalies in Korean society while the authoritarian Korean successors are nothing but puppets manipulated by imperialists.

In their zeal for moral purity, the students tend to make a stark dichotomy: something is either absolutely right or absolutely wrong. "If one decides that the government is the purveyor of falsehood, the opposite must be true" (Buruma, 1987:36). The true conscience of the nation is carried only by the students, and fundamentally irreconcilable with the spoiled power.

> It is impossible for the majority of the people and the Chun Doo Hwan clique to exist together. The struggle is reaching the decisive stage, and the final fight between a tiny fascistic clique and the democratic majority is at hand. The victory of people is historically inevitable... ("Emergency

Student Council," Korea University: Sep. 17, 1980)

In morally absolute terms, the enemy for them becomes distinctive: the foreign imperial powers and its puppets who act against the will of the minjung. Having defined their enemy, their faith convinces them that if they kick out all imperialistic foreign power, the puppets, in their simplistic logic, the dictatorial political and comprador-monopolized regime, will be so volatile that the minjung will gain self-reliance; democracy will be in bloom; this will lead to the peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula, then the nationalistic Utopian society will come to exist.[36]

As has been seen, the ideology developed by the radical Korean students in the 1980s is starkly different from the conventional ideology of South Korea. In addition, their paradigmatic perception of the world has also shifted considerably from the taken-for-granted world views of the

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[36] It is apparent that the Korean student leaders are adherents of nationalism as well as Marxism. However, it should not be understood that radical ideology is the sole determining factor of revolution. For example, the uprising in 1960 did not have an ideology such as Marxism. In terms of nationalism, it seems to me that it helps consolidate movement solidarity and enhance the alliance among different groups.

older generation.[37] The two paradigms are most likely competing with each other for political hegemony. With respect to reality, their ideological cry seems impossible to achieve by compromise or reconciliation with the present government because of the similarity between the ideological stance of students and that of North Korea.

However, the fundamental problem does not lie in their rational ideological belief. More importantly, the students translate their ideology into a concrete path of action. They have an image of transformed better world and believe that solidarity and the pursuit of common action is the means by which the transformation of society will be realized. So, they are called to action. This is what Sorel calls a myth. An aspect of reality is given to the hopes of immediate action, believing that through concerted action something real can be achieved. This illustrates that "revolts are born as much as out of hope as out of anger" (Rhyne, 1988:class). All too often, the Korean student movement is apparently seen with much more hope as well as anger or frustration.

With respect to faith and determination, a student who set fire to the United States Information Service building in

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[37] The meaning of a generation here does not solely indicates an age cohort category. It refers to a social group of varied pool of people who share the same sense of historical experiences. According to Braungart (1984:350), generations are not born, but made; thus, "A generation shares not only age-group membership ....but a sense of social consciousness and participation in the historical process."

Pusan 1982, said in his final statement in the appellate court:[38]

> Democratic society will never be realized until you and I determine to sacrifice ourselves for it. ... I hope that my death will be a turning point of U.S.-Korea relations, and that the U.S. government will not longer force the Third World countries to maintain the Cold War system, but will support and help her friend to build a democratic society and a unified country. The relationship of both countries should be based on equal friendship, not vertical control. (Source and translation from the "Cry of the People Committee," May 11, 1983)

As a radical student organization puts their determination to struggle:

> We are the noble sons and daughters of the magnanimous Paedal Race, the Korean Minjung. ...As we assess the present situation, we see that the fate of our fatherland has fallen permanently into the grasp of American dominion and aggression. We can not merely sit idly by and watch. Moreover, we can no longer sit idly by while the masses groan once again under the oppression of military dictatorship. We swear by our burning patriotic hearts that will stand in the vanguard of the struggle for national salvation, offering up our hearts and bodies in all purity. ("Oath of the Young Student National Salvation Suicide Squad," Feb. 16, 1988)

The Council of the National Student Federation formed in 1988 expresses their hopes on the reunification of Korea:

> It has been 44 years since the division of the Korea peninsula by American neo-colonial power. The economic and military invasion of American imperialism has made this land frozen with mass-production of murderous tear gas and also obligation for those divided and colonized people to fight against colonial powers in recovering national sovereignty and in obtaining full freedom. However, not having a motherland to defend and to love, what

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[38] He received death sentence, but it was reduced later to life imprisonment.

> can we do? Therefore, we, the students who are proud of having struggled for a liberated nation since the Japanese colonialism, desire to contribute to the rescue of our nation and reunification of our people with greater sense of patriotic obligation. ("We should Never be Two," April, 1988:2)

From what I have discussed, it becomes apparent that radical Korean students utilize abstract ideas and do abide by cultural myths (such as, "history calls us!") by giving noble interpretations to history for their movement. Those radical students are convinced that they are the elect, destined to carry out the will of minjung. It is from these myths that one can espouse to the morally absolute terms, good-or-evil, as being a believable call to action. Black and White are easily identified: the ruling regimes are villains; the activists are heroes. By this they are determined to act and they believe that "their cause is certain to triumph" (Sorel, 1950:42). As their movement goes further, their ideas become consolidated, and their faith becomes deeper in conviction and greater in hope. By this hope they can bring themselves into mortal conflict. In sum, the essential point here is that the presence of such ideas makes it easier to create a more or less organized protest group in line with their resource base (i.e., organizational structure).

VI. CONCLUSION

I have discussed the historical processes of the Korean student movement that have surfaced in the last three decades. Instead of identifying the structural and psychological variables which may underlie the movement, I have concerned myself with the facilitating factors.

Given the resource mobilization model, the analysis of this research suggests that the modern education system in South Korea has increased the student population and has thus formed a superimposed and segmented collectivity that is relatively cut off from the larger society. It is within this collectivity that viable and dense organizational structures, such as the student government associations, departmental activities, various "circle" (club) meetings, etc., have made it easier for the Korean students to engage in collective action and to endure their movement. Observing the micro level of the organizational structure, one of Korea's most segmented, cohesive, organizations is the informal, factional group which runs through much of Korean life. Such small-groups on campuses have been an important dynamic factor in facilitating the mobilization process and in sustaining that mobilization. It is thus my central argument that with the

primary networks that link students by means of strong emotional ties, the small group cells have been the fundamental unit for mobilizing the Korean student movement.

Furthermore, I have viewed the mobilization process of the students within the dimension of historical construction. This dimension tends to be symbolically meaningful for the actor. For example, a certain event in history becomes legendary and the belief of it is soon built into a belief structure to be shared as a part of communal culture. For this reason historical tradition is an important factor in a quick and effective mobilization.

The Confucian ideal of moral purity appears to be one of the abiding cultural themes in the student movement. Also, the widespread emphasis on equality underlies the movement groups. Such cultural belief structures, however, experience what Ogburn (1964:87-95) calls a "cultural lag" arising as a result of the differential rate of change between two parts of culture in the rapidly changing societal conditions. This ambiguous coexistence of change and continuity in a culture overall may be an incipient condition of social movement. As such, the traditional role of students and the consciousness of community are necessarily taken into account as important facilitators of the movement.

These cultural themes are combined with new ideas, and become a great facilitator. The resource mobilization model tends to ignore the significance of these cultural and

ideological aspects. Ideas in themselves do not determine whether there is a movement. However, the way in which the actor translates them into a concrete path of action becomes an important facilitating factor to make the movement sustain its violent confrontation. Ideas give direction to the movement by bringing unified perceptions; they also make a dichotomy of the "us" and the "them"; and they provide hope that great things will happen if we do take action. With the presence of the cultural ideas, the Korean students have been able to create a more or less organized protest movement and to sustain violent confrontation.

Given the ideology of radical students, it is important to understand how violence is generated. We find that the ideology of the students becomes a paradoxical mixture of moral absolutism and virulent antagonism. As Brinton (1965:176-236) saw it, "reign of terror" and "reign of virtue" grow out of the revolutionary mind set. Both extreme characteristics of virtue and violence are often two sides of the same coin. Thus, extreme moral virtue can at the same time be extreme violent absolutism.

One might then ask: to what extent is the Korean student movement to be seen as unique? Are we able to find the patterns described above other places? The answer is Yes. There may be unique cultural elements, such as the traditional role of students and a shared sense of homogeneity in the Korean student movement. However, at least the two

categories, the degree of organizational structure and the degree of intensity of ideology, can be the major patterns in other student movements.

For example, comparing the Korean student movement to the one in Indonesia reveals a similar political progression and structural background; however, the Indonesian students seem to lack a strong cultural homogeneity, that is, a shared sense of cohesive meaning that gives the collectivity a sufficient feeling of solidarity. Although the Indonesian students have various kinds of national and local organizations with a rapidly growing student population, they have not successfully mobilized for effective challenge to the political regime because of their diffused loyalty to various racial, religious, and political groups (Lyman, 1965-66:282-293). Of course, we must take into account the role of government in controlling the movement as an important facilitating factor. However, it may be attributed to the fact that unlike the Korean students, the Indonesian students do not have a strong cultural homogeneity. They seem to lack a nationally shared strong identity.

On the other hand, the recent development of the Chinese student movement deserves attention not because it occurs under the strong state machinery of socialism but because of its relatively quick communication despite its seemingly less cohesive organizational structure. It is important to note that the Chinese students have played a significant role in

other revolutionary events (for instance, the May 4th movement in 1919). They seem not only to have a historically patriotic tradition but also to share a more or less cultural homogeneity. In the 1986-87 demonstrations, the students actually intended to support the Communist Party policy of economic reform. The conservative party members, who were concerned lest the students ally with laborers and others, intervened and dismissed the party chief Hu Yaobang, who initially proposed the liberal reform. The recent death of Hu Yaobang has clearly demonstrated the potential of students for an organized opposition movement capable of presenting a lethal challenge to the Party. This incident implies that the Chinese student collectivity at any time can move from a latent to a rigorous political opposition group (even become a revolutionary force) especially when the Party is perceived to be weak, confused, and pusillanimous.

Many student movements seem to begin more out of hope than anger or frustration. The recent Chinese student movement is a good example: "Perhaps the march will not bring democracy today, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, but if <u>we</u> keep working on it, China has <u>hope</u>," said one participant in the march, ..."<u>We</u> have to transform China" (Daily Press, Fri. May 5, 1989). The moderation of the movement can be developed into a violent protest, especially when the students convince themselves that they carry out the will of their nation. As they convince themselves that "their cause is

certain to triumph" (Sorel, 1950:42), the opponents of their cause become not just human enemies but moral degenerates; they become sinners. Then, the movement is likely to become increasingly violent. Although this type of action is not rationally calculated, as Weber views it, this emotional aspect of action can change the course of history.

In sum, it is because of these two major facilitating factors (organizational structure and cultural ideas), among others, that the Korean student movement has been easily mobilized in political opposition for the last thirty years. They are likely to remain as an important political group for some time to come. Particularly when the government appears to be incompetent and is perceived to be illegitimate, the student group is likely to be a potentially subversive force. However, if the present democratization continues and the society becomes more pluralized, as diverse interest groups become organized, the student movement may become increasingly divergent in the South Korean political process. Nevertheless, as long as students retain a resource bases for potential mobilization, no one can say for sure that the student movement will disappear.

APPENDIX I

Chronology of Student Movement in South Korea[39]

Spring, 1450
Students at National Confucian Academy in Seoul protest the Great King Sejong's alleged "soft-on-Buddhism" policies. [Altogether 96 protest incidents by students and scholars occur throughout the Yi dynasty (You Young-ik, 1987:65).]

March 1, 1919 - May 1920
The Korean independence movement begins against Japanese colonial rule. Platform of the March First Declaration of Independence is spread through schools and churches in nationwide demonstrations.

October 30, 1929 - February, 1930
Students in Kwangju who save a Korean girl from a group of Japanese students are arrested. This incident sparks nationwide student demonstrations lasting four months and involving 54,000 students and thousands of arrests.

August 15, 1945
Ending of World War II and Liberating from the 36 year Japanese colonial occupation of Korea. Division of Korea was made by the United States and the Soviet Union. Beginning of the rightist-leftist student and intellectual confrontation.

August 11, 1947
A wave of arrests of leftist political forces begins under the United States Military Government in south Korea.

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[39] This section primarily refers to the work of Henderson in "Student Activism in Korea" (1988:21-24), and of NACHRK's chronological reports of human rights situation in **Korea '88** (1988:23-45). A large portion are verbatim and come from both of the above works.

April 19, 1960
The student uprising in Seoul protesting the fraudulent presidential elections of March 15 is met by martial law troops, resulting in 186 deaths and 6,022 injuries. Within a few days demonstrations have escalated and led to Syngman Rhee's resignation from the presidency on April 29.

May 16, 1961
Military coup of General Park Chung Hee strikes down student power, reunification efforts and activism.

Summer, 1961
The Korean Central Intelligence Agency is founded as a major national instrument of control and suppression of internal criticism.

March, 1964
Students in Seoul demonstrate protesting the Korea's "low posture" in establishing diplomatic ties with the former colonial power.

January - June, 1965
The involvement in the Vietnam conflict and signing and ratification of South Korea-Japan normalization treaty sparks nationwide student protests; all high schools and universities are closed.

January - April, 1974
Four emergency decrees are issued by President Park Chung Hee which are extremely suppressive towards student organizations and demonstrations. Student activists begin to go underground.

September-October, 1977
Student protests increase in intensity, refusing to cooperate with the "Student Defence Corps," which has become the only legally recognized campus organization.

May, 1978
Park re-elected through indirect electoral process. This is followed by nationwide student demonstrations demanding an end to the Yushin Constitution and restoration of civil rights.

October 16-19, 1979
Students in Pusan lead massive demonstrations violently denouncing the Yushin system of President Park.

October 26, 1979
Park Chung Hee is shot dead by the KCIA Director, Kim Jae Kyu. This brings the so-called "the spring of 1980", a hopeful state for democracy.

May 15, 1980
Tens of thousands of students demonstrate in Seoul and other cities demanding that the government adopt a new democratic constitution and that it lift martial law.

May 17, 1980
Martial law is extended throughout the country. Student leaders and opposition politicians are arrested; the universities are closed and all political gatherings are prohibited.

May 18-27, 1980
Kwangju uprising lasts for 10 days (refer to page 35-36).

March 18, 1982
The American Cultural Center in Pusan is set afire by four college students protesting the U.S. policy and involvement in Kwangju. One student in the building is killed by the fire.

February, 1983
Large-scale arrests of students for alleged membership in a "Democratic People's Federation" and a tightening of campus security.

September 25, 1984
2,500 Seoul National University students gather to revive their autonomous organization and elect a president for the Student Association.

May 23, 1985
Seventy-three university students stage a three-day sit-in at the U.S. Information Service building in Seoul demanding that the U.S. apologize to the Korean people for what they call "U.S. involvement in the Kwangju incident."

November 18, 1985
191 students from 14 universities in Seoul occupy the training center of the ruling Democratic Justice Party.

February, 1986
Nineteen students, members of Sammintu committee,

are indicted in connection with the seizure of the USIS building in May 1985, and draw jail terms ranging from two to five years.

April 28, 1986
Two students commit suicide by self-immolation protesting that military training for students is an imposition of U.S. imperialism.

May 3, 1986
Violent student demonstrations occur in Inchon.

May 20, 1986
Seoul National University student burns himself to death during a rally on the school campus.

August, 1986
The prosecutor General's Office announces the arrest of 169 members of two "leftist-leaning" student groups during the spring semester for allegedly masterminding violent anti-government demonstrations.

October 24, 1986
The Seoul District Prosecution announces that its crackdown on a 101-member student organization that is attempting to establish a Marxist-Leninist party identical to that of the North Korean Workers Party in an effort to ultimately establish a communist country on the Korean peninsula.

October 31, 1986
Large number of Students are stormed by eight thousand police on the campus of Konkuk University where they are protesting against the legitimacy of the Chun regime, and against the U.S. military presence in Korea. Students violently resist and seize five buildings on campus for three days. This results in the arrests of 1,274 students and 395 of them are charged under the National Security Law.

December, 1986
Government prosecutors announce that 3,405 persons have been arrested in 1986 in connection with political activities, including campus demonstrations -- the total includes 2,919 students.

January 14, 1987
A Seoul National University student, Park Chong Chul died after being tortured during interrogation by the National Police. Park's death sparks major nationwide student demonstrations and leads to the

resignation of several important cabinet members in the government posts, including arrests of five police officers from the Anti-Communist Division of the National Police Headquarters who were involved in the torture killing.

June 10, 1987
As the ruling party holds its convention to nominate Roh Tae Woo as Chun's successor when his term expired in early 1988, nationwide student demonstrations break out throughout the country.

June 26, 1987
Grand peace march in Seoul and 37 other major cities culminates in over two weeks of massive demonstrations; three days later, Roh Tae Woo declares direct presidential elections in a liberalized atmosphere. There is a partial defusing of confrontation with student activists.

July 9, 1987
At a funeral procession for Lee Han Yol, a Yonse University student who died after being struck in the head with a tear gas canister, an estimated half million march in an anti-government protest.

July 10, 1987
Kim Dae Jung and 2,334 other political offenders have their civil rights restored with a sweeping amnesty.

May 15, 1988
University student Cho Song Man commits suicide at Myongdong Cathedral to protest slow government progress on the release of political prisoners. The incident ends the de facto truce between the ruling and opposition parties and incites the latter to call for a government response to the issue. The opposition uses the incident to demand a full investigation of the Kwangju incident including Chun Doo Hwan's involvement.

May 18, 1988
Eighth anniversary of the Kwangju incident. Violent student demonstrations occur in Seoul and other cities. Radical students express strong anti-American sentiment. A martyr student sets himself on fire.

June 10, 1988
Radical students clash with riot police at Yonse and other universities across the country. Students

attempt to march to Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone in order to meet their north Korean counterparts for a joint conference to discuss reunification and North Korea's demand for co-hosting the Olympics. Students are turned back by 60,000 riot police in the Roh government's largest display of force against militants.

August 15, 1988

Students' second attempt to march to Panmunjom is rebuffed by tens of thousands of riot police; more than 2,000 students are arrested. Roh Tae Woo proposes a meeting with North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. Four days later, representatives of the north and south Korean government meet for negotiations at Panmunjom for the first time in nearly three years.

November, 1988

Students clash with riot police throughout the country, demanding the arrest of former President Chun Doo Hwan. Chun apologizes his wrongdoings during his seven-year rule and goes into internal exile.

APPENDIX II

METHODOLOGY

This presentation is basically a case study of a student movement. The intent was not to make arguments for a generalization to all student movements but to build a tentative frame of reference.

It was appropriate to employ a qualitative technique for this fundamentally interpretative approach. Most of the analyses are dependent upon a wide range of secondary, primary and near-primary sources as well as statistical data. Materials are drawn from a variety of sources: books, essays, newspapers, magazines, leaflets, pamphlets, court documents, newsletters, publishing letters, and human rights reports. I also conducted interviews with two Korean graduate students in America who once were involved in the student movement.

The data collection was a somewhat sporadic collection, taking bits and pieces from every available source. Given the limitations of time and the resources available for me, in reality, I encountered many impediments which hindered the collection of a very organized, extensive set of data on this

particular subject. Thus, I have simply tried to obtain all the data on the subject that I possibly could. A sizable portion of the primary evidence upon which my analysis was based came from archival and other historically relevant data obtained from organizations in America associated with Korean studies, politics, and religion. Those organizations are: The Asia Society, a public education organization in New York; The Library of Congress (the Korean Section) in Washington, D.C.; The Asia Watch, a human rights organization in Washington, D.C.; The North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea (NACHRK),[40] a religious affiliated human rights group in Washington, D.C.; and The Korea Information & Resource Center, a political group in Washington, D.C. Some publications also have been received from Korea through mail. Most of the data I have collected are written either in English or in Korean.

The following are newspapers and magazines that I have drawn from:

Newspapers: (English) The Washington Post
The New York Times
The Chronicle of Higher Education

(Korean) The Miju Dong-A (Daily)
The Miju Chosun (Daily)
The Peace Weakly
The New Korea Times (Weakly)

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[40] I would like to express special thanks to a staff member at NACHRK, Ms. Kim Hwa Young, for her help in accessing the archival data. A large portion of leaflets and court documents would have been unavailable without her generous assistance.

Underground Student Newspapers		The Minjok Minju Sonun The Heabang Sonun
Magazines	(English)	Far Eastern Economic Review Time Newsweek
	(Korean)	Shin Dong-A (Monthly) Chosun (Monthly) Current (Monthly)

As the data were initially collected in large, unorganized fragments, I attempted to systematize the information I had obtained as much as was possible. After defining the subject matter as eclectic, I organized the messy data according to historical sequences and coded them by their categories and properties. The two categories, organizations and ideology, were my major focus for the information search. For the 1960's and 70's I analyzed the student movement primarily from the historical descriptions using the published literature. For the 1980's I made extensive use of both published literature and various other primary and secondary resources.

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